

# Teaching guide: Diversity in Philosophy

Developed in partnership with Anne-Marie McCallion and produced by Amia Guha for *Women In Parenthesis*. Additional input from Amber Donovan, Amy Ward, Simon Kirchin and Robert Penney.

For underpinning research see:

- Clare Mac Cumhaill and Rachael Wiseman's [\*Metaphysical Animals: How Four Women Brought Philosophy Back to Life\*](#).
- Anne-Marie McCallion's [\*Discovering Disagreement: The Story of an Undergraduate Wartime Quartet Reading Group\*](#).

## Introduction

This teaching guide offers links to resources designed to promote diversity in philosophy, along with detailed information on the 'wartime quartet'—Midgley, Foot, Anscombe, and Murdoch—aligned with our A-level specification. While its use is optional, the guide serves as an enhanced resource to help teachers engage with contemporary philosophical research. Only specification content will be directly tested in the exams, but additional arguments and scholarship will be credited where relevant.

This guide is a resource designed to help teachers include more women. There is some evidence demonstrating that the inclusion of more women onto philosophy curricula can improve young women's participation in the classroom as well as their self-perceived philosophical capabilities. Using the work of the 'wartime quartet' in classrooms has been shown to help young women engage more enthusiastically with philosophical content and to combat 'disassociated disagreement'.

Disassociated disagreement occurs when learners misinterpret their disagreement with a particular philosophical perspective as simply *failure to understand* the topic in question. Women and other marginalised groups are more likely to do this. Displaying a broader range of views (especially those put forward by women philosophers) can help learners who suffer from disassociated disagreement identify more closely with the curriculum being taught. If a learner identifies with (perceives themselves to resemble in some way) the philosophers being taught, they are more likely to see themselves as comparably competent philosophers, this helps to ensure they are less likely to interpret disagreement as failure to understand or 'grasp' a topic because it increases philosophical confidence and self-assuredness.

Introducing learners to the diverging perspectives of the wartime quartet – by showing how their views differ from the views of many male figures on the A-level spec – can also help learners better articulate their own perspectives both by improving their self-perceived philosophical capabilities and the range of ideas they have access to. In addition to teaching the work of the wartime quartet, learners can also be encouraged to set-up their own reading groups – themed around the wartime quartet or other marginalised philosophers – by using [these reading group blueprints](#) which list key text resources and set questions for learners to follow.

This guide is intended to be an example and not exhaustive. There are many other equally important ways of diversifying the philosophy classroom which include majority world thinkers, non-white philosophers, working-class philosophers and other marginalised genders or identities.

## Contents

You can use the title links to jump directly to the different sections of this teaching guide.

Section	Page
<a href="#">Teaching the wartime quartet</a>	3
<a href="#">Mary Midgley</a>	4
<a href="#">Philippa Foot</a>	8
<a href="#">Elizabeth Anscombe</a>	12
<a href="#">Iris Murdoch</a>	17
<a href="#">Online resources</a>	20

# A-LEVEL PHILOSOPHY – 7172 – TEACHING GUIDE – DIVERSITY IN PHILOSOPHY

Version 1.1

December 2025

## Teaching the Wartime Quartet in A-level Philosophy

This section contains a guide to teaching the Quartet which is designed to be useful for A-level Philosophy teachers. Our aim in presenting this guide is to provide illustration of ways that these authors can be mentioned in classroom discussion, even if not included directly on the specification, with a view to improving the representation of female thinkers in this space. What follows are a series of recommended texts, their suggested uses and proposed difficulty level rated from 1 (accessible) to 3 (very advanced).

### Specification content including the 'Quartet'

#### Normative Ethics

Kantian deontological ethics, issues:

- morality is a system of hypothetical, rather than categorical, imperatives (Philippa Foot).

#### Set texts

- Foot P, *Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives* in *Philosophical Review*, Vol 81, Issue 3, 1972. pp: 305 to 316.
- Midgley M, *Wickedness*, Routledge, London, 1984. Chapters 1 and 5



© Sally Pilkington for Women In Parenthesis

## Ideas for extension: How to incorporate ‘the Quartet’ in A-level Philosophy

### Mary Midgley

**Midgley M, *Wickedness A philosophical Essay*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1984.**

Recommended extract: pages 1 to16

Conceiving of evil as a negative, a failure to live as we are capable. The Problem of Evil put in terms of ‘natural’ unavoidable evil and ‘moral’ deliberate human evil fails to see the importance of a range of natural motives – concern for power, aggression, territorial defence. These motives often contribute to flourishing. We need not approve of all things capable of desire, but we face a task of corresponding these goods with needs of conscious beings. Thus, we require a full analysis of the complexities of human motivation to create a priority system among these needs.

(NB: chapters 1 and 5 of this text are on the specification as a Set Text for this unit)

- Difficulty Level: Accessible
- Use for: Virtue Ethics

**Midgley M, *The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics & Animal Behaviour* in *Philosophy*, Vol. 48, No. 184, 1973.**

Recommended extract: pages 113 to 118

Blending the Aristotelian account – the ‘good’ for human beings, eudaimonia, and asking whether virtue ethics gives us sufficiently clear guidance to act – with Midgley’s defence of natural normativity to generate a virtue account compatible with an eco-ethic.

- Difficulty Level: Accessible
- Use for: Virtue Ethics

**Midgley M, *Animals and Why They Matter*, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1983.**

Recommended extract: pages 112 to 124

Exploring the ‘mixed community’ as an alternative to the Aristotelian polis, questioning if the highest form of community must be a political body, or if we may synthesize animal, environmental and human ethics in a naturalistic virtue ethic.

- Difficulty Level: Accessible
- Use for: Virtue Ethics; Animal Ethics

**Midgley M, *The Objection to Systematic Humbug* in *Philosophy* Vol. 53, No. 204, 1978.**

Recommended extract pages 147 to 169

Integrating the concepts of 'reason' and 'emotion/attitudes' in moral philosophy to regard the myth that emotions are outside of the sphere of reason as generating a wholly alien view of human life. Contrasting rationality with 'systematic humbug,' Midgley sees feeling and thought as 'conceptually' connected as aspects of conduct.

- Difficulty Level: Accessible
- Use for: Virtue Ethics; Metaethics

**Midgley M, *Is 'moral' a dirty word?* in *Philosophy* Vol. 47, No. 181, 1972.**

Recommended extract: pages 206 to 223

To carefully examine the use of the word 'moral' and its derivatives (and to some extent those of 'ethical' too) to see how they show signs of 'strain' as we stretch them to stretch to fill holes in our thinking.

- Difficulty Level: Accessible
- Use for: Virtue Ethics; Metaethics

**Mac Cumhaill C. & Wiseman R, *A Joint "No!"* in *Metaphysical Animals*, Chatto & Windus, London, 2022.**

Looking at the Quartet's response to the logical positivist orthodoxy of the day: viewing A. J. Ayer's verification principle against the Quartet's revival of metaphysics, and Hume's is-ought gap with their attempt to reconnect fact and value.

- Difficulty Level: Accessible
- Use for: Metaethics

**Midgley M, *The Game Game* in *Philosophical Anthropology*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1974.**

Recommended extract: pages 231 to 240

Emphasising the idea of 'goodness' as both natural and culturally formed, reflecting our needs as social animals. Thought and choice cannot be considered in a vacuum, rather seen as springing from activities of the human life: sex, playing games, laughing, promising, and so forth.

- Difficulty Level: Accessible
- Use for: Virtue Ethics; Metaethics

**Midgley M, *Human Ideals and Human Needs* in *Philosophy*, Vol. 58 (223), 1983.**

Recommended extract: pages 89 to 94

G.E. Moore divided ethics into two questions: what does goodness mean, and what things are good? But Midgley saw ethics as living in the chasm between these two questions, dealing with conflicts between 'admitted goods (or evils).' She calls for, a 'priority system of goods,' arrived at by a naturalistic assessment of the system of needs which they satisfy: human nature.

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging**
- **Use for: Virtue Ethics; Metaethics**

**Midgley M, *Dover Beach: Understanding the Pains of Bereavement* in *Philosophy*, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2006.**

Recommended extract: pages 209 to 230

Exploring God as a conceptual underpinning to traditional philosophy and drawing out the consequences of his absence to see an empty life without connection to a dead world. Midgley urges us to shed the Cartesian dualism fuelling the split between ourselves and natural world, and to embrace our position as animals beginning with the classical imagery of the Earth as Gaia, Greek goddess of all life.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Metaphysics of God; Virtue Ethics; Moral Realism; Animal Ethics**

**Midgley M, *Souls, Minds, Bodies & Planets in Philosophy Now*, 2004.**

[Part one](#)

[Part two](#)

Proposing a Platonic conception of the soul as an emotionally conflicted 'committee system' against the unified, abstract Cartesian soul. As part of the age-old attempt to sever Reason from Feeling, and establish Reason as the 'dominant partner', seventeenth century philosophy 'flatten[ed] out' notions of mind and body to 'look parallel.' After Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, we could keep the machine, and jettison the mental ghost, but twentieth century philosophers could not grasp the world as machines without users. Cue the 'hard problem of consciousness.' Midgley suggests that through a Platonic 'committee system' we can see the Self as deliberating conflicting considerations in an inner life profoundly influenced by the outer world.

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging (requires some pre-existing knowledge in the history of early Analytic philosophy)**
- **Use for: Metaphysics of Mind**

**Midgley M, *What is Philosophy For*, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2018.**

Recommended extract: pages 152 to 208

Considering the difficulty of the 'hard problem of consciousness' as a problem with its materialistic terms. Midgley saw this set up as futile, leaving us to reconcile how a 'lump of meat' can generate subjective awareness. Rather, once we take a 'philosophical look' we can see reductive physicalism as only one way of explaining the world, and subjective awareness another. Here, Midgley emphasizes the role of philosophy to stand from different positions to fully understand a problem.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Metaphysics of Mind (problems of consciousness)**

## Philippa Foot

**Foot P, *Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives* in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 81, No. 3, 1972.**

Recommended extract: pages 305 to 316

Learners should examine the extent to which ethical statements find expression in a Kantian-type categorical imperative or through Foot-type hypothetical imperatives ('If... then..').

Prying like Foot at the distinction between 'should' (used in Kant's hypothetical imperatives) and 'ought' (used in Kant's categorical imperatives), they may tease out again the 'special dignity and necessity' that philosophers have endowed in the moral 'ought.' This, they may recognise, is the general charge levelled the Wartime Quartet against both the consequentialists and deontologists, to rely on the mesmeric force of 'ought' to give statements so-called normative 'oomph.'

Learners may follow Foot's comparison of morality to the institution of etiquette to illumine the strength of the claim that "the normative character of moral judgment does not guarantee its reason-giving force," and draw out the consequences of the conclusion that "the grounding of a moral statement is ultimately in the facts of life."

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Virtue Ethics (this can be used as a response/challenge to utilitarianism and deontology)**

**Foot P, *Natural Goodness*, Online edition, Oxford Academic, 1 Nov. 2003**

Learners can contrast the esoteric judgements of the consequentialists, reached in particular unconnected circumstances, with the virtue ethicists' interest in their underlying traits. Comparing the 'thin' versus 'thick' evaluative language, learners can consider the impact of naturally normative vocabulary – healthy/unhealthy, excellent/defective, strong/weak – which carry information as well as the same practicality that good/bad do.

Thus learners can arrive at their study of virtue ethics with an understanding of Foot's 'natural goodness' that finds its meaning in the fulfilment of a species-specific function that tends towards flourishing. Learners may then consider the context of the polis as generating the features of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in comparison to Foot, who begins not by thinking of human association, but of plants. How might this change the nature of our duties and obligations to natural world?

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible and Challenging**
- **Use for: Virtue Ethics; Moral Realism**

**Foot P, *The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect*, Oxford Review, No. 5, 1967.**

### The trolley problem

A-level philosophers will probably recognise the infamous Trolley Problem, where Foot pins down a distinction between positive and negative duties to explain our different verdicts in cases where numbers remain the same.

Her finding is that we owe more to others in the form of non-interference than aid. Put simply, although we may not be morally required to heroically cast ourselves into a riptide to save a drowning man, we are required not to give him a shove in the first place.

Consider the two formulations of the runaway trolley and the bystander.

### Problem #1: Runaway trolley

A trolley is hurtling ahead on a track that splits in two: working on the first is a single worker, and on the second, five workers. Which will you, the controller, send the trolley down?

- The first track, letting five die.
- The second track, letting one die.

### Problem #2: Bystander

From a bridge, you see a trolley is hurtling ahead on a track towards five workers straight ahead. Next to you is a fat man – who could stop the trolley if you pushed him over. What will you do?

- Push the fat man, killing one and saving five.
- Do nothing, letting five die.

Learners will probably find that in the 'Runaway Trolley' problem, faced with letting either one or five people die, they opt to minimise loss. *Ceteris paribus*, it is a numbers game. However, in the 'Bystander' problem, our judgment is less clear. Hardcore utilitarian aside, most of us feel as though pushing the bystander violates a duty that overrides the consequentialist fixation on numbers.

Learners should consider the idea that we owe the one bystander more in our duty not to harm him than we owe to all five in terms of aid. This distinction between action and inaction, or 'doing' and 'allowing' will lay the groundwork for Foot's more expansive doctrine of the double effect.

### Doctrine of the Double Effect

The Doctrine of the Double Effect (DDE) is relevant anywhere there is a “general question of what we may or may not do where the interests of human beings’ conflict.”

Learners may use the DDE to assess the permissibility of stealing, simulated killing and telling lies as well.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Normative Ethics (response to Utilitarianism: how can we evaluate the consequences of an action when these ‘consequences’ are not always clearly linear and can multiple unforeseen consequences).**

### **Foot P, [Interview: Philippa Foot](#), *Philosophy Now*, 2001.**

Consider Foot’s practical rationality as a possible avenue to fix Hume’s is-ought gap. A-level learners will have observed the confusion in our philosophy since Hume, whereby a superlative will is summoned to get from a state of affairs to a normative ‘ought.’ Foot herself in her early work, ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,’ held that action pivots on contingent motivations, a desire that imbues reasons with a normative, willing force, but later came to the idea that ‘ought’ simply operates within our normal concepts. In her words, ‘should’ speaks of reasons.’

Learners can apply this to climate inaction. When people ask, ‘Why take care of the planet?’ The answer, ‘If you don’t, the next generations will suffer’ might be answered with ‘You have given me a reason, but I don’t care, so I will continue to act selfishly. You haven’t shown me I *should* do it.’ But this reasoning relies on a concept of ‘should’ as separate from the reasons itself. Consider instead the idea that hypothetical imperatives necessarily provide agents with both reason and motivation for action.

From here, Learners can grasp how Foot’s conception of practical rationality – goodness in respect of reasons for actions – is a fundamentally less egoist and anthropocentric framework for action, pivoting not on contingent human motivations generated from isolated psychological states, but of the interconnected facts of both human and non-human life.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Virtue Ethics**

**Foot P, *Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?* in *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Volume 15, Issue 1, Spring 1995, 1995.**

Recommended extract: pages 1 to 14

In their study of the twentieth century debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in ethical language, learners can assess Hume's fork and Ayer's verification principle alongside Foot's naturalism to see if the 'evaluative' feature of a moral proposition can coherently be conceived as distinct from the 'descriptive.'

They can consider the impact of the idea that the normative force of a moral statement – i.e. 'Human beings should tell the truth' – is derived from a conception of 'goodness' that stands in relation to the object it describes. For instance, that humans are social animals relying upon the institution of promising to make contracts and uphold duties.

Looking instead to the 'reality that surrounds man' to find a conception of goodness complementary to our needs and desires as a species, learners can contest the post-Hume philosophical schism between fact and value that underpins the logical positivist claim that moral statements are not truth-apt but merely conjectures tied to 'an individual speaker's subjective state.'

To grasp the integral role of language in metaethics, learners can look at the cluster of concepts in natural normativity – function, wellbeing, flourishing – as terms more robust than the 'emotive' quality of Ayer or 'imperative' feature of Hare. This will allow them to examine the validity of Foot's claim that linguistic philosophy fails in attempting to explain the whole function of moral evaluation in terms of a special use of language separate from its everyday use.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Virtue Ethics; Metaethics (esp. Moral Realism)**

## Elizabeth Anscombe

**Anscombe G.E.M, *Intention*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1957.**

When distinguishing between various forms of knowledge – the syllabus notes acquaintance, ability, propositional – learners can explore Anscombe’s ‘practical knowledge,’ or knowledge of the ‘means-end’ order of our own intentional action.

There are various ways we can describe our actions, and these bear order to each other. I move my legs *because* I want to move *because* I want to get somewhere; this chain of reasons is the order of my intentional action, an order that I, the first-person agent, seem to have special insight over.

Learners can explore the nature of ‘practical knowledge,’ both a certain kind of knowledge of my *own* intentional action that I do not have of other’s and a distinction between what I know I do voluntarily (intentionally) and involuntarily (unintentionally) – walking in the sun versus casting a shadow. Anscombe develops the latter notion as ‘non-observational knowledge,’ that we can know without observation both that we are engaged in an action and its cause without a mediating sensory event.

These are important considerations not just in epistemology, but in ethics and moral philosophy as well. A grasp of practical knowledge, grasping the layers of our intention as it relates to descriptions of levels of human action, will be essential before practical reasoning in 3.2.1 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics.

- **Difficulty Level: Advanced**
- **Use for: Metaphysics of Mind; Epistemology (esp. ‘what is knowledge?’)**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *On Promising and its Justice, and Whether it Need be Respected in Ethics, Politics and Religion*, Volume three of *The collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.**

Recommended extract: pages 10 to 21

To test the tripartite view of propositional knowledge, learners may examine the paradox of knowledge and belief by looking at the nature of promising.

To make a genuine promise, the agent must know he is making a promise. But then what *is* promising? The explanation itself seems to recycle an unexplained term. To have genuine knowledge, the agent must know that he has knowledge. But then what *is* knowledge?

Anscombe uses an example of a bottle: if a bottle is only a certain type if it has a picture of itself on it, that picture would have to have another picture and so forth. Likewise, must the agent’s promise entail an infinite series of thoughts?

Anscombe assures us that this “need not trouble us if we say that to think something is also to think that you think it.” In parallel, learners may explore the consequences of the conclusion, ‘*to know something is also to know that you know it.*’

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging**
- **Use for: Epistemology (esp. Tripartite view of knowledge)**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *Hume and julius caesar* in *Analysis*, Volume 34, Issue 1, October 1973.**

Recommended extract: pages 1 to 7

To complement Hume's appraisal of the role of testimony in the set text 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,' learners may look at the way Anscombe and Hume diverge in answering the question: how do we know Caesar was a real man who died on the Ides of March?

Hume argues that humans infer an original event through a series of testimonies "till we arrive at... eyewitnesses and spectators." But Anscombe finds this incredible, such reasoning "is not to infer effects from causes, but rather causes from effects." In other words, we do not believe Caesar existed because we believe in the successive positive evidence, we believe in the evidence because of our belief in his identity and existence. We directly trust what we are taught.

So contrary to Wittgenstein who wrote that "finding something written, from which it emerges that no such man ever lived" would throw up our belief in Caesar, Anscombe insists we must still ask a question that she commends Wittgenstein for asking much later in *On Certainty*: "What would get judged by what here?"

The greater lesson here will be found through Anscombe's rejection of epistemological coherentism: "a general epistemological reason for doubting one (source of information) will be reason for doubting all, and then none of them would have anything to test it."

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging to Advanced**
- **Use for: Epistemology (esp. Against Coherentism)**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature* in *Metaphysics and The Philosophy of Mind*, Volume two of *The collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.**

Recommended extract: pages 3 to 20

Learners may follow Anscombe in undertaking a grammatical investigation of philosophy of perception, looking at the structure of 'sensation' as a concept in a complex language game. This procedure, in contrast to the ontological approaches dominating the contemporary debate, allows us to see the 'intentional object' as a grammatical feature not a classificatory category. Here Anscombe's treatment of intention in action theory translates to the notion of the 'distinct intentionality of sensation' in philosophy of perception.

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging to Advanced**
- **Use for: Epistemology (esp. Against Coherentism)**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *The First Person* in *Metaphysics and The Philosophy of Mind: Volume two of The collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.**

Recommended extract: pages 21–36.

It may be interesting to explore ‘responses to Descartes’ cogito’ outside of the empiricists in Anscombe’s investigation of ‘I’ and first person.

Anscombe approves of Descartes’ use of ‘I’ in the *Meditations*, that he cannot doubt ‘I exist’ but can on the same grounds doubt ‘I have a body’ and ‘I am Descartes.’ Here we see the almost paradoxical function of ‘I’: Descartes can establish the non-identity of himself with ‘Descartes.’ This seems equivalent to ‘Descartes is not Descartes,’ but it is not. ‘I’ refers to nothing short of Cartesian ego, though we are ourselves human beings. So, there is a distinct sense in which we use ‘I’ which Anscombe is led to eventually classify as *non-referential*, as there is no referent for ‘I.’

More broadly, however, Anscombe and the Wartime Quartet criticise the Cartesian atomistic self for fuelling a disconnect between mental and worldly and generating a detached philosophy of rationality. In ‘The First Person,’ Anscombe puts forward an alternative to what she calls “the Cartesian conception of consciousness.” Learners can also examine the case that our Cartesian philosophy of psychology lays the grounds for a misunderstanding of intentional action.

- **Difficulty Level: Advanced**
- **Use for: Metaphysics (esp. Problems of Consciousness); Epistemology (Esp. Cartesian Scepticism)**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *Modern Moral Philosophy* in *Ethics, Politics and Religion*, Volume three of *The collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.**

Recommended extract: pages 26 to 42

For context to the contemporary field of moral philosophy and to be able to evaluate between utilitarianism, Kantian deontological ethics, and Aristotelian virtue ethics, Learners should advance through Anscombe’s three theses in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy.’

Here learners would learn about the urgent need for a robust philosophy of psychology to equip the project of modern moral philosophy: an understanding of ‘action,’ ‘intention,’ ‘pleasure,’ and ‘wanting.’ They would also learn to question the concepts of ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’ and whether it is proper at all to continue to use a sense of ‘moral ought’ or if this theological-legal structure of ethics ought to be dispensed in an age where the necessary social framework for making such talk meaningful is absent.

Learners would encounter the first use of the term ‘consequentialism’ to the dominant form of philosophising of the well-known English writers from Sidgwick (1900) to the ‘present’ (1958), which denies a distinction in responsibility between foreseen and intended consequences of our actions. Learners can see here how she lays the groundworks for the modern project of virtue ethics, taken up by many including her peer Philippa Foot and philosopher Julia Annas, whose works on virtue ethics are both set texts.

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging**
- **Use for: Virtue Ethics; Normative Ethics (Esp. Arguments against Deontology and Utilitarianism)**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *Contraception and Chastity* Incorporated Catholic Truth Society, London, 2003.**

Recommended extract: Chapters 1 to 3

Though it is curious why abortion and war – Anscombe’s most outspoken topics in applied ethics – do not appear on the AQA Applied Issues section, learners can make a parallel with the ethics of ‘simulated killing within computer games’ to Anscombe’s consideration of contraception. Here, intentional action will be key.

Anscombe’s argument that contraception distorts the life-generating; loving nature of the marital sex act may be paralleled accordingly. Simulated killing distorts the destructive, cruel nature of the killing act, so as there is no such thing as an insignificant sexual act due to the centrality of marriage as a natural human institution, there can be no such thing as insignificant computer killing, due to the centrality of *violence* as an equally natural human institution.

Note: this is only one potential line of reasoning. The key here is to see how Anscombe’s treatment of intention illumines thinking on practical ethics.

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging**
- **Use for: Applied Ethics (especially simulated killing).**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *On Brute Facts in Ethics, Politics and Religion*, Volume three of *The collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.**

Recommended extract: pages 22 to 25

Challenging Hume’s fork through considering the truth of the statement, ‘X owes the grocer £5 for potatoes.’ Anscombe argues that there are levels of description of human action beyond relations of ideas (100p makes a pound) and matters of fact (buyer asked for potatoes, grocer gave them to him and charged him for them). There are several relations of brute facts here. Put simply, ‘I dropped off the potatoes’ is brute to ‘I supplied you with potatoes’ is brute to ‘You owe me £5.’

Here learners can explore Anscombe’s idea that Hume’s insight was symptomatic of a larger failure of action theory to bridge not just from non-normative to normative, but between levels of descriptions of actions.

MMP is already listed above.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Epistemology (Against Hume’s Fork)**

**Anscombe G.E.M, *Causality and Determinism* in *Metaphysics and The Philosophy of Mind*, Volume two of *The collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.**

Recommended extract: pages 133 to 147

Anscombe saw First Cause arguments as proceeding from an assumption of their own conclusion, offering only a preliminary proof of the principle of causality along the lines of ‘any event that occurs must have a cause.’ The syllabus lists Hume’s objection to the causal principle as a critique of this argument, but Anscombe bears a further criticism, challenging the idea that causal connections are necessary connections.

Anscombe distinguished between causation and determination (nothing is caused until it occurs while an event can be predetermined) and argued that effects are not dependent on specific causes (two different causes can cause the same effect). She also rejected Hume’s characterisation of the causal relation as constant conjunction and held instead that we can observe causation in a single instance. Learners may develop this line of reasoning in terms of the First Cause argument, as well as explore its implications for probabilistic accounts of causation.

- **Difficulty Level: Advanced**
- **Use for: Metaphysics of God (esp. First Cause arguments and the idea that causal connections are necessary connections).**

## Iris Murdoch

**Murdoch M, *The Idea of Perfection* in *The Sovereignty of Good*, Routledge Great Minds, London, 2014.**

Recommended extract: pages 1 to 45

Examining the intersection of epistemic and moral processes in the psychology of perceiving mind-independent objects through 'unselfing.' Understanding the phenomenology of perception, learners will have better grasp of how the quality of attention shapes moral character, and how the role of consciousness in Murdoch's conception goes beyond data collection to take an active role in ascertaining moral reality.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Normative ethics (against utilitarianism and how perceptions impact judgements of consequences) or epistemology.**

**Murdoch M, *Descartes and Kant in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, Vintage Digital, Online, 2012.**

Recommended extract: pages 204 to 217

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Normative Ethics (Against Deontology); Epistemology (Against Cartesian Scepticism).**

**Murdoch M, *Comic and Tragic in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, Vintage Digital, Online, 2012.**

Recommended extract: pages 51 to 76

Comparing 'I think therefore I am,' to a framing of Murdoch's unselfing 'I see therefore I am not,' learners can examine the 'self' as a place of illusion or Archimedean certainty. Looking beyond Descartes' cogito, learners can develop the consequences of a moral philosophy which begins from distinct individual realities, not the solitary thinking mind.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Contemporary Virtue Ethics; Epistemology (Esp. Cartesian Scepticism)**

**Murdoch M, *Morality and Religion in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, Vintage Digital, Online, 2012.**

Recommended extract: pages 227 to 231

Witnessing the neglect of significant aspects of human life like love, attention and moral vision in the consequentialism of contemporary ethics, learners can revive the activity of the inner self in moral analysis as a viable alternative to the existentialist-behaviouristic model privileging the will.

- **Difficulty Level: Advanced**
- **Use for: Normative Ethics (esp. Against Utilitarianism and Deontology)**

**Murdoch M, *The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts* in *The Sovereignty of Good*, Routledge Great Minds, London, 2014.**

Recommended extract: pages 75 to 103

Developing virtue ethics through deep engagement in the human psyche and its relationship with the good to pair virtue with attentive vision: 'to love that is to see.' Learners can examine how this diverges from Aristotelian polis-centric model with an 'other-focused' conception of virtue beyond the good for all principle understood impersonally.

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Contemporary Virtue Ethics (Bringing virtue ethics up to the modern day).**

**Murdoch M, *Fact and Value in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, Vintage Digital, Online, 2012.**

Recommended extract: pages 20 to 34

Challenging the twentieth century divide between fact and value, learners can return to the Platonic idea of irreducibly evaluative reality to recognise the value-laden nature of perception. Here learners can see the ability of vision to witness objective reality and cultivate moral character as opposed to a moral relativism that severs ethics from reality.

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging**
- **Use for: Metaethics (Esp. Against Relativism).**

**Murdoch M, *On 'God' and 'Good' in The Sovereignty of Good*, Routledge Great Minds, London, 2014.**

Recommended extract: pages 45 to 75

Drawing out the consequences of God's abandonment, learners can see how Murdoch's unusual Platonism channels the Good it through the conceptual hole left by Judaeo-Christian God: "a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention." So learners can see Murdoch's call to let go of our fantasies as a quasi-agapeic form of love: "grace, a supernatural assistance to the human endeavour which overcomes empirical limitations of personality."

- **Difficulty Level: Accessible**
- **Use for: Normative Ethics; Metaphysics of God**

**Murdoch M, *Morality and Religion in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, Vintage Digital, Online, 2012.**

Recommended extract: pages 227 to 231

Criticising non-cognitivism for reducing moral statements to prescriptions or emotive assertions of approval or disapproval, learners can see how this so-called 'Newspeak' fails to recognise the phenomenological significance of moral reality, expressing mere preference or emotion, without the ability to describe shifts and transformations in moral vision.

- **Difficulty Level: Challenging**
- **Use for: Religious Language; Moral Realism (Against Non-Cognitivism)**

## Online resources

Useful online resources on diversity in philosophy.

### In Parenthesis Network

[In Parenthesis](#) is a Research Centre that supports scholarly work, philosophical engagement and projects on the Wartime Quartet of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdoch as well as connected figures such as Dorothy Emmet, Donald MacKinnon, Julius Kovesi and Heinz Cassirer.

The [resources page](#) includes podcasts and recommended readings.

The [research page](#) features a range of publications focused on the quartet and related topics.

### Diversity Reading List

The [Diversity Reading List](#) (DRL) collects high quality texts in philosophy written by authors from under-represented groups. Their aim is to make it easier for you to find such texts and use them in your teaching.

The DRL also includes a [blueprints](#) section where contributors have created reading list schedules with accompanying study questions to help those wishing to explore this material in a self-directed way where it is not already included on their syllabus.

### SOAS Decolonising Toolkit

The [SOAS Decolonising Philosophy Toolkit](#) and the SOAS Decolonising Philosophy Handbook are the world's first pedagogical resources exclusively devoted to the subject of decolonising philosophy curricula in higher and secondary education.

### The Philosophy Exception

[The Philosophy Exception](#) is a database of English-language literature on Equality, Diversity and Inclusivity (EDI) issues in philosophy that appears in journals, edited volumes, books, and, where possible, society newsletters and reports.

### The Deviant Philosopher

[The Deviant Philosopher](#) is a teaching resource created by a group of scholars who believe that there is value in deviating from the traditional Anglo-American philosophical canon. They include a page on primers which provide resources to help instructors become familiar with new material on various topics

## History of Philosophy without any gaps

[History of Philosophy without any gaps](#) is a podcast series on the major philosophers as well as the lesser-known figures of the tradition.

## Project Vox

[Project Vox](#) amplifies the voices of women philosophers.

## Print

[Print](#) aims to highlight philosophical works of women and individuals from other marginalized groups and sustain the presence of these figures in the history of philosophy.