



A-level PHILOSOPHY 7172/2

Paper 2 The metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind

Mark scheme

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Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

No student should be disadvantaged on the basis of their gender identity and/or how they refer to the gender identity of others in their exam responses.

A consistent use of 'they/them' as a singular and pronouns beyond 'she/her' or 'he/him' will be credited in exam responses in line with existing mark scheme criteria.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

0 1 State the difference between God being everlasting and God being eternal.

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- This question concerns a difference/distinction between two ways that God is said to be related to time.
- Students may introduce their subject as ‘the God of classical theism’, before stating the key issue: how to characterise God’s relationship with time. Some students might associate classical theism more narrowly with the view that ‘God is eternal’. Either approach is fine in this context.
- The difference is between God being...
 - everlasting: existing throughout/within all of time (existing temporally) and...
 - eternal: existing outside of/independently of time (existing timelessly/atemporally).
- NB: It is important to distinguish between God as an ‘everlasting’ being from other finitely old temporal beings (eg humans or the universe itself). There are different ways this can be done:
 - Students might say that ‘an everlasting God exists throughout time’ or ‘within all of time.’
 - Students may omit those references to ‘throughout time’ or ‘within all of time’ but say instead that an ‘everlasting God exists within time without beginning or end’.

Distribution of marks

If students give precise definitions of the two concepts, leaving the differences implicit but perfectly clear, full marks can be awarded. Some students will hone straight in on the difference, however, and should be marked according to the levels of the generic mark scheme. But this approach will still signal their understanding of the two concepts. So here is a guide to the awarding of marks:

- Students awarded **3 marks** will show clear knowledge and understanding of both concepts of God’s relationship to time.
- Students awarded **2 marks** will show clear knowledge and understanding of one concept, but there will be imprecision on the other (perhaps through redundancy).
- Students awarded **1 mark** will either show clear knowledge and understanding of one concept but be incorrect on the other, or else they will show imprecise / fragments of knowledge and understanding of both concepts. In the event that a student gives correct definitions of the concepts but gets them the wrong way round, then 1 mark can also be awarded.

Examples for 3 marks

- An eternal God is timeless. An everlasting God exists throughout time.
- An everlasting God is without beginning and end but still exists within time, whereas an eternal God transcends time.

- An eternal God exists outside of time. This differs from an everlasting God who is within all of time.

Examples for 2 marks

- An eternal God is an atemporal being, whereas an everlasting God is a temporal being.
- An everlasting God is one that exists within and throughout all of time. An eternal God is one that sees past, present and future simultaneously [NB: A student who adds this to their otherwise precise definition of an 'eternal God' should not be penalised for redundancy, but they need to be explicit about the *atemporal* nature of God for full marks to be awarded].
- An eternal God has a timeless existence, whereas an everlasting God just exists without beginning or end.

Examples for 1 mark

- An eternal God is without beginning or end, but exists within all of time. An everlasting God is without beginning or end but is outside time.
- An eternal God and an everlasting God have different relationships to time.
- An eternal God exists timelessly. An everlasting God exists forever.

Notes:

- If students refer to God's 'life' or God 'living' in their answer to this question, this is a legitimate rephrasing. Some of the classic philosophical texts treating the concepts of 'eternity' and 'everlasting' use this language (eg Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Book V).
- If students say that an 'eternal God transcends time and space', we can treat that as harmless redundancy. If, however, a student claims that an 'everlasting God exists within time and space' or 'within time and the universe', that is stretching the claim too far: many philosophers (eg Craig) who accept that God exists in time (since the creation of the universe) maintain that God is aspatial/transcends space.
- Note that 'forever' is sometimes used by student to define God's 'everlasting' existence in time: this is not sufficiently precise to fully capture God's existence throughout time 'in both directions' (ie without beginning as well as without end). But if a student explicitly says something like 'an everlasting God exists in time like us, but unlike us God had no beginning and will continue to exist forever', that is fine: this captures God's permanence.
- As in the example immediately above, it is to be expected that some *metaphorical* spatial language will be used if students want to characterise an 'everlasting God's relationship to time' (eg 'God moves/passes through time sequentially'). That is natural, not to be penalised, and is clearly different from explicitly claiming that 'God exists throughout space'.
- Some students render everlasting as 'sempiternal', which is acceptable, although to receive full credit they still have to explain what everlasting/sempiternal means
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 2 Explain Aquinas' Second Way (his argument from atemporal causation).

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may characterise this as 'a cosmological argument for the existence of God'.
- It makes use of 'a posteriori' reasoning (based on sense experience of the world).
- It is 'deductive': if the premises are true the conclusion must be true (aside, arguably, from the very last step that identifies this first cause with God – this is probably not intended to be a valid step at this early stage in the *Summa Theologica*, but a reasonable one).
- The argument concerns 'efficient causality', which for Aquinas is an atemporal/vertical/hierarchical sequence of cause and effect (as opposed to a temporal/horizontal/chronological sequence).

NB: It is possible for students to give an account of the argument without making any of the above points, but for full marks students must not state or clearly imply that the argument concerns temporal/horizontal causality.

The argument

- In explaining the argument students will need to explain the logical steps. They do not have to structure the argument as below, but it must be clear how the premises relate to the conclusion(s): the logical links must be clear.
 - P1: We know that the world contains (efficient) causation (or an order of cause and effect).
 - P2: Nothing can be the (efficient) cause of itself (if it could it would have to be prior to itself).
 - 'Prior' here is not (in typical interpretations of this argument) taken to mean temporally prior but rather metaphysically prior (in terms of dependence).
 - P3: If the series of (efficient) causes were infinite with no first (efficient) cause then there would be no subsequent (efficient) causes (contra P1).
 - C1: Therefore, there is a first (efficient) cause (and this is what we call God).
- Other points students might make by way of explanation:
 - The argument involves some reductio ad absurdum reasoning (ie the reasoning behind P3, and, arguably, P2 also - see text below).
 - Here is the original text. Students may make use of some of the same phrasings, though this is not a requirement:

“The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.” (*Summa Theologica*, q. 2, art. 3)

- NB:
 - As indicated at the beginning of this indicative content, students can be given credit for making general points about (some) cosmological arguments, in so far as they are also true of Aquinas’ Second Way.
 - The wording of the question in parentheses clearly indicates which of Aquinas’ arguments this concerns. If students just explain **another cosmological argument** (eg the Kalām) then no matter how good it is, they cannot progress beyond **Level 1**: for recognising an argument for the existence of God from the relevant cosmological/causal family.
 - If a student **blurs rather than totally confuses** their account of the Second Way with other cosmological arguments – most obviously Aquinas’ own - then depending on the extent of this, they could still get to **Level 3**: if the ‘substantive content’ is present. There are, of course, clear similarities in the logic and wording of Aquinas’ arguments, but there are also features that are distinctive to the Second Way, and the strongest responses will contain these features.

Notes:

- Students should not be penalised if they speak only of a ‘first (efficient) cause’ rather than ‘God’.
- Students should not be penalised if they speak only of ‘cause and effect’ rather than ‘efficient cause’, so long as they do not cast this in explicitly temporal terms (eg ‘the first cause of the beginning of the universe’ would be a complete misrepresentation of the argument).
- As indicated earlier, students are free to use terms like ‘prior’ as these can be understood in metaphysical terms: this is precisely the terminology used in standard translations of Aquinas’ argument that it is impossible for something to “*eset prius seipso*” (exist prior to itself). Students may also use ‘before’ in this sense. The key thing is not to suggest that the argument is concerned with the temporal beginnings of the world/universe.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 3 Explain Basil Mitchell's view about religious language using his 'Partisan' story.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Given the context for Mitchell's development of the 'Partisan' story, students might explain his view against the backdrop of Flew's cognitivist position, which he is responding to directly.
- Flew holds the following:
 - (a) For a claim to be meaningful it must be [analytic or] falsifiable – falsifiable means that there is possible evidence (the person making the claim would recognise) that counts against a claim / is incompatible with it (this would include any actual evidence as well).
 - (b) In the case of religious language this condition (a) is typically not met and so (many) religious utterances are meaningless.
- Mitchell accepts (a) the falsification principle, and so he is a cognitivist, with respect to religious language, but he argues against (b).
- Mitchell argues that the believer's religious claims are still meaningful since religious believers agree that there is evidence (eg pain) that counts against their belief (eg in the God of classical theism), even if their attitude of faith/trust means that they will not (for the time being) allow this evidence to change their minds (and override the reasons/evidence which made them believers in the first place):
 - "[T]he theologian does recognise the fact of pain counting against Christian doctrine. But it is true that he will not allow it-or anything-to count decisively against it; for he is committed by his faith to trust in God. His attitude is not that of the detached observer, but of the believer" (Mitchell, in Flew, Mitchell and Hare, 'Theology and Falsification', in Mitchell [ed.], *The Philosophy of Religion*).
- The Parable of the Partisan illustrates this view of Mitchell's. The believer (the Partisan) has an attitude of trust in the Stranger, which he will not easily give up despite acknowledging the existence of contrary evidence. It is not possible to say in advance how much evidence would falsify the claim that the Stranger is on his side, but this does not render the claim meaningless because it is admitted that there could be contrary evidence which would indeed prove decisive and move him to abandon his belief.
- NB:
 - To access **Level 3 and beyond**, students **must do more than (1) place Mitchell within the context of the debate on religious language** (eg 'cognitivist v non cognitivist', 'meaningful v meaningless'), and **(2) offer details of the Parable of the Partisan**. This is of course creditworthy, but to reach Level 3 and beyond students must start to make logical

connections between features of the story and Mitchell’s philosophical view on religious language (see below for guidance on this).

- The precision and fullness of the explanations provided will determine whether responses advance to **Levels 4 and 5**. The best students will recognise the **ambiguity** of the evidence that the Partisan and the religious believer are faced with. Students can access these top levels even if they never even mention Flew but show, through their answer, that religious claims can be falsified, and that is what makes them (cognitively) meaningful. Because the question asks for an **explanation of Mitchell’s view** rather than an ‘argument’, students need not conclude their answer with an emphatic: ‘Therefore, religious language is falsifiable...’. So long as this point is clearly in their explanation, that is fine.
- The table below summarises the kind of points that students might make:

Partisan parable	Meaning in relation to religious language
The Partisan meets a Stranger, who deeply impresses him, and the Stranger tells him he is a member of the resistance movement.	The religious believer comes across some form of evidence that for him supports the existence of God.
The Partisan is utterly convinced of the Stranger’s sincerity and decides to trust him.	The religious believer develops an attitude of trust in God.
The Stranger acts ambiguously: sometimes he is seen acting in ways which help the resistance; sometimes in ways which help the enemy.	Some evidence supports the existence of God (eg the order and complexity of the universe) and some challenges it (eg the existence of evil).
The Partisan accepts that some behaviours count against his claim – and this is shown by the fact that he has doubts on occasion about the identity of the Stranger – but he continues to assert “The Stranger is on our side”, and in the end argues that the Stranger has good reasons for his ambiguous behaviour.	The believer accepts that some evidence challenges his claim (eg the existence of evil) - and this is shown by the fact that he has doubts on occasion about the existence of God – but he continues to assert “God exists”, and argues that there are sufficient reasons why this challenging evidence exists (eg God’s reasons for permitting evil).
This means that the Partisan’s claims are falsifiable.	This means that the believer’s claims are falsifiable.
But, when pressed, the Partisan needn’t (and perhaps couldn’t) say how much evidence against his claim would be needed for him to give up that claim.	But, when pressed, the believer needn’t (and perhaps couldn’t) say how much evidence against his claim would be needed for him to give up that claim.

Notes:

- Students may also juxtapose Mitchell’s characterisation of religious language as an expression of “significant articles of faith” with two approaches he rejects: (1) “provisional hypotheses to be discarded if experience tells against them”; and (2) “vacuous formulae (expressing, perhaps, a desire for reassurance) to which experience makes no difference” (Ibid).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 0 4** Explain the evidential problem of evil **and** explain how Hick responds using the idea of soul-making.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Explain the evidential problem of evil...

- This is the argument that the existence of evil, though not logically incompatible with God's existence, nonetheless makes the existence of God unlikely/improbable.
- Students may therefore make a direct contrast with the logical problem of evil, but there is no requirement to do so. If students do and if it helps to clarify what is meant by the evidential problem of evil, then they should receive credit.
- The evidential problem of evil is a non-deductive (ie inductive/abductive) argument where the conclusion (that God does not exist) is not guaranteed but is, nonetheless, well-supported (so proponents would say) by the reasoning.
- Here is a version (based on the work of Rowe) as an example of how students might explain the evidential problem of evil:
 - P1: If God exists then God is omnibenevolent (ie perfectly morally good), omniscient and omnipotent.
 - P2: If such a being exists, then any evil that exists must exist for a morally good reason (given God's knowledge of and capacity to stop/remove evil).
 - P3: We do not know of any morally good reason that would justify the existence of certain evil events that exist.

- Rowe gives two vivid examples: the suffering of a child (moral evil) and the suffering of a fawn (natural evil). The (actual) case of the child concerns Sue: a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan was severely beaten, raped and then strangled to death early on New Year's Day in 1986. The (hypothetical) case of the fawn (the 'Bambi' objection to God's existence) is described thus:
 - “In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering” ('The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism').
- P4: If we do not know of any morally good reason for many evil events (such as the ones exemplified above), then there probably isn't a morally good reason for at least some of these events.
- C1: Therefore, for at least some evil events, there isn't a morally good reason that would justify them.
- C2: Therefore, God (probably) doesn't exist.
- In the version above the issue with these examples of evil (of which Rowe makes it clear there are many other such examples) is that we are unable to justify them.
- Students are likely to put the issue in terms of one or more of the following: (1) the quantity of evil/suffering in the world, (2) the quality/intensity/nature of particular evils, (3) the (unfair/random) distribution of evil, (4) the pointlessness of at least some evil.
- Do not penalise students who omit 'omniscience' in their articulation of the problem of evil ('omnipotence' will do the job), but if they do use it then they should, of course, use it correctly and consistently.

...and how Hick responds using the idea of soul-making.

- The soul-making response addresses the problem of evil by arguing that God creates a world permitting evil because it is required for the moral growth and character-development of God's creation towards perfection. Evil is necessary for the development of our good, and the development of our good is part of God's providential plan.
- In the context of a response to an evidential problem of evil, soul-making should be seen as (and is seen by Hick as) a theodicy: a theodicy aims to do more than just give a logically possible explanation of evil (as a 'defence' would do) but to give, instead/moreover, a reasonable/plausible theistic explanation of evil (some philosophers have advanced theodicies as true explanations).
- The general argument is as follows but it is unlikely that this will be explained in a step-by-step way:
 - P1: A world containing evil is required for humans to be capable of moral development, including the acquisition of certain virtues (eg compassion, courage, charity).
 - P2: A supremely good God would want creatures to be capable of moral development, including the acquisition of such virtues, as we strive for perfection/to be like God (a process which continues after our physical death).
 - C1: Therefore, if God creates a world, then it must be a world with evil.
- For Hick it is crucial that this process continues into the afterlife (this is part of how he explains seemingly pointless ('dysteleological') suffering).
- Students may use analogies for P1 (as Hick himself does): eg parents allow children to make mistakes so that they learn from this (charity, compassion, resilience etc).
- For Hick, although there seems to be too much evil for there to be a God (the evidential problem explained above), it is important that this is the case in order for there to be sufficient 'epistemic distance'. This allows human beings to choose to believe in God and to love God. Students may discuss the way in which this deals specifically with physical/natural evil (including animal suffering).

- NB:
 - If students refer in their answer to our 'perfectibility' when explaining Hick's theodicy, or the process whereby we become 'like God', then this can be taken to imply the eschatological dimension that is so important to Hick's argument (since 'perfection' and 'God likeness' seem otherwise unachievable). Such answers can be awarded **full marks (12)** (assuming all necessary level descriptors are met).
 - Students who do not directly mention or even allude to the eschatological dimension at all, could still access the top band of marks (10-12), but they would have to hit all the necessary levels on aspects of 'soul making' as it relates to life before death.
 - In the (unlikely) event that a student responds exclusively to **one part of the question**, but to a very high standard (most plausibly the evidential problem of evil), then they can access up to the top of **4-6 band** but no higher.

Notes:

- Although 'free will' does not play the central role in Hick's theodicy that it does in some other responses to the problem of evil, it is not irrelevant and is required for soul-making. Freedom is an important gift from God: the value attached to the performance of moral actions and the cultivation of moral character depends in large part on this freedom. So this is creditworthy.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 5 Is the teleological/design argument for the existence of God persuasive?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Conclusions may include:
 - YES:** some version of the teleological/design argument for the existence of God is persuasive (either conclusively or to a high degree of probability).
 - YES, PARTIALLY:** some version of the teleological/design argument is persuasive (either conclusively or to a high degree of probability) but it does not persuasively prove the existence of the God of classical theism / the Abrahamic traditions.
 - NO:** no version of the teleological/design argument for the existence of God is persuasive (neither conclusively nor to a high enough degree of probability).
- Students may explain general features of arguments from design at the outset:
 - they are teleological: concerned with order and/or purpose of some sort;
 - they are a posteriori: arguing from observable features of the universe to the existence of a being (God) who designed the universe;
 - they are generally inductive: striving to deliver probable conclusions in favour of God/a designer's existence.
- Design arguments are sometimes divided up into those that focus on instances of spatial regularity and those that focus on temporal regularity, although they can also be used in combination.
- Students are likely to select from the following arguments and responses.

The design argument from analogy (as presented by Hume)

- P1: In the organisation of parts for a purpose nature resembles the products of human design.
- P2: Similar effects have similar causes.
- P3: The cause of the products of human design is an intelligent mind that intended the design
- P4: A designer must be distinct from what is designed.
- C1: Therefore, the cause of nature is an intelligent mind that (a) intended the design and (b) is distinct from what is designed.
- C2: Therefore an intelligent designer (God) exists.
- Students may also make the point that the works of nature are 'so much greater' (eg more complex) than the works of humanity that the designer of nature must be 'so much greater' and therefore possess some (or all) of the attributes of the God of classical theism.

Paley's design argument: argument from spatial order/purpose

- Students may interpret Paley's argument as a deductive argument, as follows:
 - P1: Anything that has parts organised to serve a purpose is designed.
 - P2: Nature contains things which have parts that are organised to serve a purpose.
 - C1: Therefore, nature contains things which are designed.
 - P3: Design can only be explained in terms of a designer.
 - P4: A designer must (a) be or have a mind and (b) be distinct from what is designed.
 - C2: Therefore, nature was designed by a mind that is distinct from nature.
 - C3: Therefore, such a mind (God) exists.
- Alternatively, students may take this as an inductive argument, whereby 'parts organised for a purpose' are most likely explained by intelligent agency. This is likely to be explained in conjunction with the 'watch maker' analogy.
- Some students will also take Paley to be advancing a more straightforward argument from analogy, comparing the world with machines, much like Hume's account of the argument (though this interpretation is not now widely accepted as there is evidence from Paley's work that this is not what he is doing). This should be credited, but if this is done in addition to a rendition of Hume's version, then a judgement must be made, on a case-by-case basis, whether these students are actually saying anything substantially different. If not, this is at best an elaboration of the same argument rather than a new argument. The stronger responses will make plausible distinctions.
- Some students might mention Paley's argument that even if things with 'parts organised for a purpose' were produced by prior things in the world of nature with 'parts organised for a purpose', (a) this still requires a designer because an infinite regress is unacceptable, and (b) if anything, this should 'increase [our] admiration' of the designer, such is the sophistication of the designing capacities built into the natural order.

Swinburne's design argument: argument from temporal order/regularity

- Swinburne presents an inductive/abductive (ie argument for the best hypothesis) design argument. This features analogy, but its distinctive focus is the temporal order (or 'regularities of succession') within the universe as a whole (ie the regular and universal fundamental laws of nature) in order to demonstrate that the existence of God is likely.
 - P1: The universe as a whole contains temporal order/regularities of succession (ie the regular and universal fundamental laws of nature).
 - P2: There are two possible explanatory hypotheses: (H1) temporal order has a scientific explanation; or (H2) temporal order has a personal explanation (eg explaining the singing of a song over time in terms of the singer's intentions/purposes).
 - P3: (H1) fails: science can only explain the existence of regularities of succession in terms of more fundamental regularities of succession. So, we cannot give a complete scientific explanation of the temporal order displayed in the fundamental laws of science (science cannot itself explain why the fundamental laws of science exist as they do).
 - P4: (H2) can explain (fundamental) scientific regularities of succession. They are similar to regularities of succession produced by human agents (eg the singing of a song), and so, by analogy, are produced by rational agency.
 - H2 also has in its favour the virtue of simplicity in the sense that that it would mean that all explanation is ultimately of one kind: personal.
 - P5: The agency in question would have to be of immense power and intelligence, free and disembodied.
 - C1: Therefore, an agent probably exists (God) with immense power and intelligence, who is free and disembodied.
- Students might add that Swinburne claims that there being no explanation at all of temporal order is highly improbable.

- Students may also add that Swinburne sees several main advantages to this approach over arguments from spatial order:
 - temporal order cannot be explained in terms of evolution in the way that spatial order can;
 - there is no temporal disorder to account for (the laws of nature are unchanging) as there is spatial disorder (eg blindness);
 - spatial order presupposes temporal order: evolution requires there to be laws of nature.
- Students may add that God is the simplest hypothesis with reference to:
 - God's uniqueness – it is simpler to suppose one God than many;
 - God's infinitude – it is simpler for God to be unlimited (eg in power: any finite degree of power would require an explanation (why that value?));
 - God's uncreated nature: God must be uncreated because there would otherwise be an (unacceptable) infinite regress.

Issues that may arise for the arguments above, including:

- Hume's objections to the design argument from analogy, including:
 - the analogy made is weak – the universe is more like a vegetable/animal than a 'watch or knitting-loom';
 - regress argument: if order in the universe is explained by order in the ideas of a mind then that order itself needs explaining, and so a regress of 'universes of ideas' threatens the supposed simplicity of invoking God as an explanation;
 - there is a 'great disproportion' between a part of the universe and the whole universe that undermines the inference that something similar to human intelligence caused the universe;
 - even if we could infer from part to whole, there is no good reason to choose design by an intelligent mind as the explanation of the whole universe;
 - if the analogy is followed faithfully, it would/could result in many conclusions that run contrary to classical theism; for example:
 - as the universe is finite we cannot infer an infinite cause;
 - the existence of spatial disorder (see below) would support an inference to a cause that was not omnipotent and omniscient but one that makes mistakes;
 - designers are not always creators (eg architects), and they work with pre-existing materials: the God of classical theism is associated with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and the design argument does not demonstrate that;
 - just as human objects are created by many individuals, it would be rational to infer that the universe was made by a pantheon of gods;
 - we always find minds connected to bodies, but God is meant to be incorporeal;
 - human designers often die whilst their creations continue – thus God might not be eternal.
- The problem of spatial disorder (as posed by Hume and Paley):
 - the universe contains vast areas of space in which there exists 'spatial disorder' – ie no organisation of parts/no purpose, or organisation that serves a purpose ineffectively. As the design argument is meant to explain the whole universe, it is not clear why spatial order should be prioritised over spatial disorder in the arguments that focus on this type of order.
 - Responses to this might include the idea that there is a reason for this so-called 'disorder' (meaning that it is not, in fact, disorder) or that the disorder is in some sense the result of human choices.
- The design argument fails as it is an argument from a unique case (Hume):
 - Our inferences from effects to causes are based on repeated observations ('constant conjunctions') of the sequential order of events. However, in the case of the universe, we only have experience of one universe and therefore cannot legitimately make any inference to a purposeful cause (unlike human creations, which we have so much experience of). We can never tell, from a single instance of an event, what the cause is, let alone that it is

an intelligent, purposeful agency. To make an inference about the production of universes we would need to have experience of many universes, which we lack.

- Responses to this might include: (1) We can draw conclusions about the unique universe through analogical reasoning as long as it is not completely unique and is similar enough to human-produced temporal order (which it is). Or (2) Scientists draw conclusions about the origin of a unique universe (our own), so there's nothing wrong with philosophers doing the same.
- Whether God is the best or only explanation:
 - In order to infer that there is a designer of nature, we have to rule out other possible explanations of the organisation of parts for a purpose, and these other possible explanations may be no less (or more) plausible/probable; for example:
 - if we assume that matter is finite and time infinite then, over enough time all possible combinations of matter would occur by chance, so our own universe is not as improbable as it might appear;
 - the theory of evolution by natural selection has the benefit of being a metaphysically /ontologically simple explanation as it does not 'multiply entities beyond necessity' (Ockham's Razor), working as it does with natural processes alone.
 - Responses might involve the claim that evolution is the method by which God brings about order (ie 'indirect design');
 - the natural sciences give us no reason to think that the universe is characterised by infinite time (eg by appealing to 'Big Bang' cosmology);
 - appeals may be made to the fine-tuning argument: there are so many other ways the universe could have turned out which would not have led to intelligent life, so there is something special about ours which requires a purposive explanation (Swinburne's card-shuffling machine example may be deployed here).
 - Some sceptics might appeal to the 'multiverse' (as an alternative to the 'fine tuning' hypothesis). Others might insist that the existence of our universe (with its spatial and temporal order) is just a brute fact that requires no further explanation.

Notes:

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make). The primary focus is on understanding (AO1) and evaluation (AO2): eg the persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be a form of inaccuracy that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

Section B

Metaphysics of mind

0 6 State what mind-brain type identity theory claims about mental states.

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Mind-brain type identity theory is a reductive, physicalist (or materialist) theory in the philosophy of mind.
- Mind-brain type identity theory identifies (types of) mental states with (types of) brain states.
- The AQA Specification definition reads: “All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction)”. This would be sufficient for full marks, even though the physicalism is implied rather than stated explicitly. What that definition does do is bring out the nature of the relevant reduction: ontological rather than analytic.

Distribution of marks:

There are two dimensions that are essential for students to include to receive maximum marks:

(1) the general metaphysical nature of the reduction/identity claim: ontological (mind to body/mental to physical – so physicalist in outlook).

(2) the (physical) site of the reduction of mental states: the brain (its states/properties/events etc).

- Students awarded **3 marks** will make those points clearly and correctly with sufficient precision.
- Students awarded **2 marks** will be clear and correct on one, but imprecise or implicit on the other (eg an implicit answer on the reduction side of the position could say that the theory ‘identifies mental states with brain/neural states’ without specifying the physicalism of this position).
- Students awarded **1 mark** will make just one correct point, or else show fragments of knowledge of both points.

NB: Students do not have to explicitly state the ‘type’ dimension, so long as they do not state or clearly imply a token stance on identity theory. And students do not need to include ‘all’ in their explanation of the claim

- Students may approach the question by making any of the following creditworthy points:
Mind-brain type identity theory claims...
1. mental states are identical to (or ontologically reducible to) physical states (ie physicalism is true);

2. the relevant physical states they are identical to (or ontologically reducible to) are brain/neural states (in contrast to other physicalist positions, such as behaviourism);

NB: These first two points would be sufficient for maximum marks. But students may also say that mind-brain type identity theory claims...

3. propositions about mental states are not equivalent in meaning to propositions about brain/neural states (ie it is not an analytic reduction);
4. the theory proposes a reduction of types of mental state to types of brain state (rather than a reduction of token states: ie this is not mind-brain token identity theory).

Examples for 3 marks

- Mind-brain type identity theory is a physicalist view of the mind, which claims that mental states can be reduced to brain states.
- Mind-brain type identity theory claims that mental states are identical to brain/neural states. This is an ontological reduction (not an analytical reduction).
- Mind-brain type identity theory claims that we can identify (types of) mental state with (types of) brain state, but our talk of mental states (eg 'pain') does not mean the same as our talk of brain states (eg 'Group C nerve fibres').

Examples for 2 marks

- Mind-brain type identity theory claims that mental states are reducible to (or identical to) brain/neural states.
- Mind-brain type identity theory claims that types of mental state are ontologically reducible to types of brain state: ie they mean the same thing.
- Mind-brain type identity theory claims that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states. Each and every mental state has a token brain state.

Examples for 1 mark

- Mind-brain type identity theory identifies mental states with physical states.
- Mind-brain type identity theory claims that the mind and the brain are the same thing.
- Mind-brain type identity theory claims there is no analytic reduction of the mind to the brain.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 0 7** Explain **one** similarity and **one** difference between interactionist dualism and epiphenomenalist dualism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Similarities between interactionist dualism and epiphenomenalist dualism:

- They are both dualist theories, according to which mental states/substances/properties/events are:
 - non-physical
 - not reducible to physical states/properties/events
 - not [logically] supervenient upon physical states/properties/events
 - not identical to physical states/properties/events.
- They both claim that what happens physically causes (at least some of) what happens mentally (or, as property dualist variants might put it, is *causally relevant* in explaining what happens mentally).
- NB:
 - That these two positions are ‘both theories of mind’ (or ‘both concerned with similar questions in the philosophy of mind’) should not be considered worthy of credit in and of itself.
 - Some students will rightly associate epiphenomenalist dualism with (versions of) ‘property dualism’, as a candidate position in the contemporary philosophical landscape. If, however, the defining feature of epiphenomenalist dualism is taken to be the existence of mental states which are causally inert, it is logically possible to take ‘substance dualism’ as a version of epiphenomenalism: after all, that is one of the (unwelcome) implications of substance dualism for its critics.
 - What students must be careful not to do, however, is to present epiphenomenalist dualism in terms of a ‘causally inert substance’ *and then* claim that this ‘substance’ is a ‘byproduct of the physical brain’, since ontological dependence on anything (other than God) would undercut any claim that the mind/mental states constitute a substance.

Differences between interactionist dualism and epiphenomenalist dualism:

- Interactionist dualists claim that what happens mentally causes (at least some of) what happens physically [in/using the body], whereas epiphenomenalist dualists claim that what happens mentally has no causal impact on what happens physically (the mental is a mere ‘by-product’; mental states are mere ‘epiphenomena’).

- Interactionist dualists claim that the physical world is not causally closed (ie that not all physical events have a sufficient physical cause), whereas epiphenomenalist dualists claim that the physical world is causally closed (ie that all physical events have a sufficient physical cause).
- Interactionist dualists claim that what happens mentally can have mental effects, whereas according to (most versions of) epiphenomenalist dualism what happens mentally has no effects, including no mental effects (though some might allow for causal relations between mental properties).
- NB:
 - Students are asked for **one** difference and **one** similarity. Additional similarities or differences are redundant and this should be taken into account in the awarding of marks. It is still possible, however, for a student to be awarded maximum marks, but only if the other expectations of a **Level 5** response are met, and these additional similarities and/or differences are not compromised by imprecision.
 - A student who explains **one (or more)** differences exceptionally well but does **not include a similarity** (or vice versa), cannot progress beyond **Level 3**: it is failing to address half of the question.
 - As a general guideline, those accessing **Levels 5 and 4** will offer **one** more or less precise and full explanation of a difference and **one** more or less precise and full explanation of a similarity.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 8 Explain Ryle's 'soft' philosophical behaviourism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Ryle's 'soft' philosophical behaviourism is likely to be treated as a physicalist (or materialist) position (as per the AQA Specification).
- According to the Specification, 'soft' philosophical behaviourism is the view that: "Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language)".
- NB: For students to access **Level 4 or 5**, responses should show an understanding of:
 - **(1) the analytic/linguistic nature of the reduction/translation** (concerned as it is with the identification of ordinary language about mental states with ordinary language about behavioural states/dispositions); this can be achieved by reference to 'talk', 'statements', 'propositions' or even in clear examples: students may, but need not, specifically state that it is an 'analytic reduction'.
 - **(2) Ryle's 'soft' behaviourism includes behavioural dispositions.**
 - It is possible for students to access **Level 3**, with the 'substantive content' judged to be there, if their answers are **missing (1) or (2) but not both**.
- Students may approach the question by presenting Ryle's 'soft' behaviourism as a positive thesis about how we should understand propositions about the mind/mental states.
- Students may also approach the question by presenting Ryle's 'soft' behaviourism within the context of his critique of (substance/Cartesian) dualism
- Some students may also bring out the distinctive character of Ryle's position by way of a contrast with 'hard' philosophical behaviourism. This should not be treated as redundancy, but students need to be careful not to confuse the two positions (see the notes section below).

Descriptions of mental states are descriptions of behavioural dispositional states:

- Ryle argues that to talk about 'the mind' and 'mental states' is (at least often) to talk about publicly observable overt behaviour or behavioural dispositions which can be expressed in hypothetical and empirically verifiable 'if-then' sentences.
- Students might explain what a dispositional property is. Ryle gives the example of the solubility of sugar which tells us about how the sugar will behave if put in a water: it will dissolve.

- These behavioural dispositions are ‘multi-track’ in the sense that there are indefinitely many complex ways in which one might behave when that fits a given mental ascription. (This is, arguably, a point of difference with ‘hard’ behaviourism according to which a *complete/definitive* analysis can be given of mental concepts).
 - “When Jane Austen wished to show the specific kind of pride which characterised the heroine of ‘Pride and Prejudice’, she had to represent her actions, words, thoughts and feelings in a thousand different situations. There is no standard type of action or reaction such that Jane Austen could say ‘My heroine’s kind of pride was just the tendency to do this, whenever a situation of that sort arose’ (*The Concept of Mind*).
- Descriptions of behavioural dispositions will be given in ‘ordinary language’. (This point is arguably a difference with ‘hard’ behaviourism according to which the analysis of mental concepts can be given, without loss of meaning, in terms of the language of physics.)
- Here is a passage where Ryle explains his view using the example of “knowing French” in a way that brings out some of the points mentioned above:
 - “To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates it correctly into his own tongue. This is, of course, too precise. We should not withdraw our statement that he knows French on finding that he did not respond pertinently when asleep, absent-minded, drunk or in a panic; or on finding that he did not correctly translate highly technical treatises. We expect no more than that he will ordinarily cope pretty well with the majority of ordinary French-using and French-following tasks. ‘Knows French’ is a vague expression and, for most purposes, none the less useful for being vague” (Ibid).

Attack on the “doctrine of the ghost in the machine”, ie (substance/Cartesian) dualism

- Substance/Cartesian dualism makes a “category mistake” (it assigns mental concepts to a logical category to which they don’t belong) when it wrongly (a) assigns ‘mind’ (and ‘mental states’) to the categories of ‘thing’, ‘stuff’, ‘attribute’, ‘state’, ‘process’, ‘change’, ‘cause’, and ‘effect’; and (b) conceives of them as ‘non-physical’ and ‘ghostly’.
- Ryle’s view, on the other hand, avoids this issue by thinking of mental states as nothing over and above behavioural dispositions (just as the university, in his famous example, is nothing over and above the ‘colleges’, ‘lecture theatres’, and ‘libraries’ etc).
- His position also avoids the “pseudo-philosophical” problems generated by this dualist “category mistake”, such as the problem of other minds and the problem of mental causality. There is no problem of other minds since “The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same” (Ibid), and there is no issue of mental-physical/behavioural causation since propositions about mental states are just propositions about behavioural dispositions.

Notes:

- If students just explain ‘**hard**’ philosophical behaviourism, then no matter how good it is, they **cannot progress beyond Level 1**: for recognising a version of philosophical behaviourism.
- However, if a student **blurs rather than totally confuses their accounts**, at certain points, then depending on the extent of this, they could still get to **Level 3**: if the ‘substantive content’ is present.
- There is controversy over whether Ryle should or should not be considered a philosophical behaviourist at all, and students might wish to mention this. This should not be penalised for redundancy, but the student should engage with the question as asked, and should still give an account of how his work might (and indeed has) been seen as behaviourist (as above).

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 0 9** Explain eliminative materialism **and** explain how it can be argued that it is self-refuting as a theory.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Explain eliminative materialism...

- Eliminative materialism is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind.
- According to the AQA Specification: “Eliminative materialism is the position that some or all common-sense (‘folk-psychological’) mental states/properties do not exist and/or our common-sense understanding of mind is radically mistaken.” This thesis is defended most notably by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland (although students may also associate Dennett with this stance).
- ‘Folk-psychology’ could be explained in terms of a psychological theory constituted by the common views about the mind that ordinary people are inclined to endorse. One might compare this to ‘folk-physics’ (the common view of people about the fundamentals of physical reality, in a certain time or place), although students must keep the focus on ‘folk-psychology’ as a common view of the mind/mental states and not treat these analogies as synonymous.
- Elimination is not the same as reduction:
 - With reduction the propositions on both sides of the reduction are true: the concepts being reduced both refer to (or pick out) something in reality.
 - With elimination, mental concepts are being removed (eliminated) from our mature scientific theories, and so any propositions including them are false, or they have implications/rest on assumptions that are false: these mental concepts (to some extent) fail to refer to (or pick out) something in reality.

- Students might, as part of their explanation of the view, include reference to the sorts of motivations for this view. Here are some such motivations:
 - Reasons/arguments for materialism/physicalism in general, including the success of the physical sciences.
 - Folk-psychology is an empirical theory (it postulates 'mental states', such as 'beliefs' and 'desires', to explain and predict behaviour), but...
 - It has too many explanatory failures: folk-psychology cannot offer (scientifically) satisfactory explanations of mental illness, creative imagination, pre-linguistic learning, or memory.
 - It shows no/little signs of growth/promise of future development: folk psychology is 'stagnant' and 'infertile'. There hasn't been any growth and development for thousands of years.
 - It does not cohere with other empirical (scientific) theories such as particle physics, atomic and molecular theory, organic chemistry, evolutionary theory, physiology, and neuroscience.
- As part of their explanation students might refer to the elimination of other widely utilised empirical 'folk' theories/concepts, which they draw from the history of science: phlogiston, élan vital, caloric etc. (As indicated above, however, it would be a mistake for students to state or imply that these are *examples* of folk-psychology.)

...and explain how it can be argued that it is self-refuting as a theory.

- This argument against eliminative materialism is that it is self-refuting in the sense that it cannot be adequately articulated without (at least implicit) contradiction.
- It is likely to be explained in terms of 'belief': the articulation of the theory itself would be the articulation of a 'belief' in eliminative materialism (proposed for others to 'believe') and so would require the truth of the very theory it claims to be false (ie the truth of folk psychology which posits 'beliefs'): according to some eliminative materialists (eg the Churchlands), there are no such things as beliefs. Thus in proposing eliminative materialism the proponent is contradicting themselves.
- But this argument could be put in terms of other mental states (or combinations of them): eg a 'desire' to persuade people of the truth of eliminative materialism so that they have the same 'belief' about it.
- A step-by-step outline of the argument follows (though, of course, (a) it need not be explained in this order or format, and (b) the fact that the question asks students to 'explain' rather than 'outline' might mean that the students' answers are more likely to be written in continuous prose than to be in step-by-step form):
 - P1: According to folk psychology, belief is a (genuine) mental state: there are such things as beliefs.
 - P2: The eliminative materialist (sincerely) asserts that folk psychology is false.
 - P3: (Sincere) assertions are the expressions of belief.
 - C1: The eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false.
 - C2: The eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine mental state: there are (and can be) no such things as belief.
 - (C2 involves a contradiction).
- Students may collapse the argument by making the point entirely in terms of belief.
 - P1: According to folk psychology, belief is a (genuine) mental state: there are such things as beliefs.
 - P2: The eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false.
 - C1: The eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine mental state: there are (and can be) no such things as beliefs.
 - (C1 involves a contradiction).

Other approaches

- Some students might frame the whole argument in terms of ‘intentionality’: the aboutness/directedness of the mind as a defining feature of the mental (eg characterised by ‘beliefs about’ or ‘desires for’). Any theory of mind (including eliminative materialism) presupposes the reality/existence of these mental states and so any attempt to deny them is incoherent/self-refuting.
- Some students may also frame the argument in terms of logical/semantic properties (eg meaning and truth) rather than beliefs and desires.

NB: In the (unlikely) event that a student responds exclusively to **one part of the question**, but to a very high standard (most plausibly in explaining eliminative materialism), then they can access up to the top of **4-6 band** but no higher.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

1 0 Are functionalists right to claim that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Functionalist theories of mental states take the view that mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles.
- Credit can be given for reference to various versions of functionalism:
 - In the AQA Specification, functionalism is defined as being the claim that “all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.”
 - Machine functionalism: mental states are machine states specified in terms of their inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states by a (deterministic or probabilistic) machine table.
 - Causal functionalism: mental states are defined in terms of the causal role they play in a network of inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states.
 - Psycho-functionalism: mental states are the entities postulated by the best scientific explanation of human behaviour and are specified causally in terms of the functional roles they play in producing the behaviour to be explained.
 - Analytic functionalism: all statements about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (analytically reduced/translated without remainder) into functional statements.
 - For any of these species of functionalism there will be role and realiser versions. Although the way this question is phrased suggests the former, the latter could still be relevantly discussed/included:
 - Role functionalists identify the property of pain with a higher-level functional/causal/relational property.
 - Realiser functionalists identify the property of pain with the actual property that realises the ‘pain’ role.
 - Functionalist theories claim that mental concepts are functional concepts (like ‘clock’) rather than as non-functional (i.e. intrinsic) concepts (like ‘diamond’).
 - Mental states are therefore multiply realisable: multiple functionally identical (functionally isomorphic) set-ups could realise a particular mental state.
 - Functionalism, as defined above, is neutral on the dualist/physicalist question, but many functionalists are in fact physicalists and claim that only something physical could realise a mental state or, indeed, could play any kind of functional role at all.
 - NB: Students can present functionalism in physicalist or non-physicalist forms. The stronger responses will either deal with the ontological issue explicitly, or else their discussion of the relevant arguments will be internally coherent and support the logic of the argument overall: eg, where essays present functionalism as a physicalist position, arguments typically used against physicalism will be more obviously relevant than for those essays which apparently make a virtue of functionalism’s ontological neutrality, but then give considerable space to arguments against physicalism without adapting them for the purposes of evaluating functionalism.

- Some possible conclusions:
 - **YES:** functionalists are right to claim that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (functionalism is correct).
 - **NO:** functionalists are not right to claim that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (functionalism is incorrect).
 - **NO:** functionalists are not right to claim that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles because some mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles, some cannot.
 - **DEPENDS:** One version of functionalism is correct but one or more other versions is not.

- **YES:** functionalists are right to claim that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (functionalism is correct).
 The thought that surely mental states are there to do something, to play an important role in the life of an organism (and so functionalism is supported by/compatible with evolutionary biology).
- The (alleged) advantage of understanding how differently constituted beings (especially animals) can be considered minded.
- It may be aligned in general with progress in the natural sciences; more specifically students may argue that functionalist approaches to mind receive support from advances in computing and robotics/AI and/or the possibility of extra-terrestrial life.
- This theory might improve upon the weaknesses of other theories:
 - It recognises the unavoidability of reference to internal states (unlike logical/analytical behaviourism).
 - It allows for multiple realisability (unlike mind-brain type identity theory).
 - It does this while still giving an explanation of what all mental states of a given type have in common (unlike token identity theory and logical/analytical behaviourism).
 - Though typically adopted by physicalists it is not dependent on the truth of physicalism and is compatible with some forms of dualism.

- **NO:** functionalists are not right to claim that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (functionalism is incorrect).
 - Absent qualia/functional zombies (Block's "Chinese mind"):
 - P1: A functional zombie is functionally identical to something that has qualia/phenomenal properties (eg Block's "Chinese mind").
 - P2: A functional zombie is conceivable.
 - P3: If X is conceivable then X is logically/metaphysically possible.
 - C1: Therefore, a functional zombie is logically/metaphysically possible.
 - P4: If a functional zombie is logically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties.
 - C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.
 - There are of course challenges to the conceivability or possibility of this scenario: eg Chalmers' response based on gradual replacement of neurons with silicon chips and the impossibility of 'fading' or 'disappearing' qualia, demonstrating that two functional isomorphs would both experience qualia/phenomenal states.
 - It might also be argued that a "Chinese mind" made up of Chinese message-passers is no stranger a scenario than a carbon brain made out of neurons.
 - Inverted qualia:

- P1: It is conceivable that two functionally identical beings/systems could have inverted qualia with respect to each other (the ‘invert scenario’).
- P2: If X is conceivable then X is logically/metaphysically possible.
- C1: Therefore, this ‘invert scenario’ is logically/metaphysically possible.
- P3: If the ‘invert scenario’ is logically/metaphysically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties.
- C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.
 - There are of course challenges to the conceivability or possibility of this scenario: eg Chalmers’ response based on the impossibility of ‘dancing’ qualia, demonstrating that two functional isomorphs would always be phenomenally identical.
- Absent intentionality/understanding/semantics (Searle’s “Chinese room”): no amount of syntactical processing can yield semantics/understanding of meaning. The scenario he describes involves notes being passed in Chinese, the rule-book generating answers, and the non-Chinese speaking person in the room using the rule-book to output ‘answers’ in Chinese:
 - P1: The non-Chinese speaking person in the room is functionally identical to a native Chinese speaker.
 - P2: The non-Chinese speaking person in the room does not understand Chinese (although s/he understands syntax, s/he has no grasp of the intentional content (the semantic meaning) of the statements).
 - C1: Therefore, being functionally identical is not sufficient for being mentally identical, so functionalism is false.
 - There are challenges to the conceivability or possibility of the “Chinese room” scenario’: eg the whole system does understand Chinese (the ‘systems’ reply).
- The Mary/knowledge argument applied to functionalism (Jackson):
 - P1: Mary knows all the functional facts about mental states before her release.
 - P2: Mary does not know all the facts before her release (she does not know the phenomenal facts relating to visual experience).
 - C1: Therefore, there are non-functional facts about mental states.
 - P3: According to functionalism all facts about mental states are functional facts.
 - C3: Therefore functionalism is false.
- The issue that the mental seems causally irrelevant if functionalism is true: if M is realised by P, and P is what causes its effects, then M (the mental) is causally irrelevant.
- Issues of definition: if people don’t have the same inputs to/outputs from their mental state, say of pain, and pain is to be defined in terms of those inputs/outputs, then people cannot share the same mental state of pain.
- **NO:** Some mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles, some cannot.
 - A student might argue, for example, that intentional states can be characterised in terms of functional roles but phenomenal states cannot (see qualia issues above).
- **DEPENDS:** One version of functionalism is correct, but other versions are not.
 - A student might argue, for example, that only realiser (and not role) functionalism can give an adequate explanation of mental causation.

Notes:

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make). The primary focus is on understanding (AO1) and

evaluation (AO2): eg the persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be a form of inaccuracy that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.