



A-level PHILOSOPHY 7172/1

Paper 1 Epistemology and moral philosophy

Mark scheme

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Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

No student should be disadvantaged on the basis of their gender identity and/or how they refer to the gender identity of others in their exam responses.

A consistent use of 'they/them' as a singular and pronouns beyond 'she/her' or 'he/him' will be credited in exam responses in line with existing mark scheme criteria.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

0 1 What is the difference between analytic truths and synthetic truths?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students can answer this question in terms of the ontological or the epistemological difference (or both).

Ontological difference:

- Analytic truths are propositions which are made true by virtue of the meaning of the words - eg 'all bachelors are unmarried men' (and not by facts about the world).
- Synthetic truths are propositions which are made true by facts about the world - eg 'John is a bachelor' (and not merely by virtue of the meaning of the words).

Epistemological difference:

- Analytic truths are propositions whose truth can be known by virtue of knowing the meaning of the words (as opposed to knowing facts about the world).
- Synthetic truths are propositions whose truth must be known by knowing facts about the world (and not merely by knowing the meaning of the words).
- Students may elaborate that in an analytic truth, the predicate is contained within the subject and thereby define an analytic truth as a 'definitional' truth or as being 'true by definition', in contrast to synthetic truths, which are not definitional truths/true by definition, ie where the predicate is not contained in the subject (following Kant).
- Students may also point out that an analytic truth can be turned into a logical truth by the appropriate replacement of terms for synonymous terms (Frege).

Examples for 3 marks

Answers that gain 3 marks may give varying degrees of detail (compare examples 2 and 3) but will be clear and precise on both types of truths. Below are 3 examples, but any legitimate way of explaining the distinction should be credited if students demonstrate that they understand the key terms.

- Example 1: 'An analytic truth is a proposition whose truth depends only upon the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts. A synthetic truth is a proposition whose truth depends upon how reality is in addition to the meanings of its constituent concepts.'
- Example 2: 'Analytic truths can be known to be true in virtue of knowing the meanings of the terms involved, whereas synthetic truths can only be known to be true in relation to how the world is.'

- Example 3: ‘Analytic truths are true in virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. They are a priori and necessary, meaning their denial leads to a contradiction and so they are true in every possible world – eg “All bachelors are unmarried men”. Synthetic truths are truths that are true in virtue of how the world is, they are contingent, not necessarily true, so they could have been false, eg “the sky is blue”, which is true but not in all possible worlds.’

Examples for 2 marks

Answers that gain 2 marks will typically demonstrate a clear understanding of one of the truths and a partial or less precise understanding of the other (example 1), or might demonstrate accurate knowledge of other features of analytic and synthetic truths (eg a priori/a posteriori) and/or give relevant examples, but not explicitly address the issue of what makes them true/how they are known to be true (example 2).

- Example 1: ‘Analytic truths are true by definition whereas synthetic truths are not true by definition’.
- Example 2: ‘An analytic truth is one that is known a priori and has been described as a relation of ideas. A synthetic truth is one that is known a posteriori and has been described as a matter of fact. An example of an analytic truth would be “All bachelors are unmarried men” whereas an example of a synthetic truth would be an empirical statement like “grass is green”.’

Examples for 1 mark

Answers that gain 1 mark might be clear on one aspect of the question only (example 1) or demonstrate a partial or imprecise understanding of both (example 2).

- Example 1: ‘Analytic truths are statements which are true by definition, eg “a triangle has 3 sides”. A synthetic truth is one that is true in all possible worlds.’
- Example 2: ‘Analytic truths are true in themselves – eg “All bachelors are unmarried men”, whereas synthetic truths are verified through the senses and so are empirically verifiable’.

Notes:

- Students are likely to characterise or exemplify (some) analytic truths as a priori and necessary, and (some) synthetic truths as a posteriori and contingent. They may in this regard refer to ‘Hume’s fork’ and the distinction between ‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’. Whilst this is legitimate and should not be classed as redundancy (see example 3 for 3 marks above), students should be careful not to present ‘analytic’ as synonymous with ‘a priori’ and ‘synthetic’ as synonymous with ‘a posteriori’.
- Students who only define the terms negatively – eg ‘analytic truths are not true in virtue of the way the world is’ or ‘synthetic truths are not true by definition’ will have only partially defined the term. In order to give a full response, they must say something positive – eg what it is that makes them true, either the meanings of the terms involved in the proposition or the way the world is.
- Students are asked about the classically drawn distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths. They are not asked to evaluate the distinction or to deny that such a distinction can rightly be drawn (Quine). Answers that take either of these approaches would not be effective ways of responding to the question if sufficient knowledge of the distinction itself is not clearly demonstrated.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 2 Explain the tripartite view of propositional knowledge.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The tripartite view of propositional knowledge is the position that the three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a subject (S) to know a proposition (P) are: 1) P is true, 2) S believes that P, and 3) S is justified in believing that P. NB: To be substantively correct (and so gain 3 marks or more), an answer needs to do more than simply state these three conditions – eg ‘the tripartite view is that propositional knowledge is justified true belief’. Substantively correct responses should explain that these three conditions are deemed to be (individually) necessary and (jointly) sufficient (which may be expressed with varying levels of detail and precision) and/or explain (rather than merely state) each of the three conditions.
- The tripartite view may be identified as the ‘JTB’ account, and students may trace the origins of the account back to Plato.
- Students may explain/exemplify what is the difference between a necessary and a sufficient condition in general. Eg by explaining/exemplifying how some necessary conditions are not sufficient conditions, and how some sufficient conditions are not necessary conditions, using examples which are unrelated to the definition of knowledge.
- Students may explain/exemplify why ‘truth’ is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for knowledge - eg ‘knowledge’ is a ‘success term’ and denotes getting something right rather than getting something wrong. Truth is therefore a necessary condition. However, merely uttering a true proposition doesn’t mean that you know it because you might not understand or accept the truth of the proposition you are uttering.
- Students may explain/exemplify why ‘belief’ is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of knowledge - eg to know a proposition you must understand it and accept the truth of it. Belief is therefore a necessary condition. However, merely understanding and accepting the truth of a proposition doesn’t mean that you know it because the proposition might be false or irrational.
- Students may explain/exemplify why ‘justification’ is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of knowledge - eg ‘knowledge’ is an ‘honorific term’, so we do not want to count lucky guesses or irrational true beliefs as knowledge. Justification is therefore a necessary condition. However, merely being justified in believing a proposition doesn’t mean you know it because it could be false.
- Students may refer to Zagzebski’s account of the JTB account in the anthology text.
- Following Zagzebski, students may, but are unlikely to, explain that the tripartite view attempts to give a definition of knowledge and go on to explain the desiderata of a definition.

Notes:

- Since the tripartite view is commonly abbreviated in textbooks, students should not be penalised if they write it down in short-hand (eg SkP iff: 1) P, 2) SbP, 3) SjbP) as long as it is clear from their response that they know what the tripartite view is.
- Some students may define propositional knowledge, distinguishing it from ability and acquaintance knowledge. This should not be classed as redundancy and understanding of ‘propositional knowledge’ is credit worthy. However, the focus of the question is on the tripartite view and not the three types of knowledge, so students must ensure that they explain the tripartite view.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 0 3** Explain how local scepticism and global scepticism are similar **and** how they are different. **[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Similarities:

- Both local scepticism and global scepticism are examples of philosophical scepticism (as opposed to normal incredulity).
- Philosophical scepticism can be defined as the position that our ordinary methods of justification (eg empirical experiences) are inadequate to establish a knowledge claim so that we cannot have any knowledge of the claim we are making.
- Students need not explain philosophical scepticism in terms of justification, but they must be clear that it precludes the possibility of knowledge; it must be clear from the student's response that it isn't merely the position that we do not (yet) have knowledge (but might do in the future).

Based on local and global scepticism as forms of philosophical scepticism, other similarities that students may draw upon include:

- Local and global scepticism can be used to test knowledge claims and so push us to justify our beliefs more rigorously, thus both have a methodological function.
- Both local and global scepticism are not (typically) sensitive to ordinary evidence (in the relevant domains) and often use thought experiments to illustrate how our beliefs are unjustified (rather than empirical evidence).
- Both local and global scepticism are theoretical and so (tend to) have less (if any) practical import.
- Some of the above points may be more relevant to specific examples of local scepticism. If students use a specific example of local scepticism to illustrate and draw out a similarity/similarities specific to that example (but not others), then this should be credited.

Differences:

Local scepticism	Global scepticism
Local scepticism is limited scepticism about a specific claim or a specific area/region/branch/source of knowledge (and therefore it leaves open the possibility of knowledge in other areas).	Global scepticism extends doubt without limit.
Local scepticism is the claim that: • knowledge in/of this specified claim/area is impossible (relative to all our current means of justifying our beliefs); • we cannot know anything (to be true or false) in the specified area; • epistemological doubt can be extended without limit in the specified area; • all of our knowledge claims are false in a specified area; • none of our beliefs about that area are sufficiently justified to count as knowledge.	Global scepticism is the claim that: • knowledge in/of all claims/areas is impossible (relative to all our current means of justifying our beliefs); • we cannot know anything (to be true or false); • epistemological doubt can be extended without limit; • all of our knowledge claims are false; • none of our beliefs are sufficiently justified to count as knowledge.
Examples of local (limited) scepticism: • Scepticism about other minds (without scepticism about one's own mind). • Scepticism about the possibility of knowing about the past/future (without scepticism about knowledge of the present). • Scepticism about induction/inductive inference as a method of knowledge acquisition (without scepticism about other methods, eg direct experience). • Scepticism about whether we can know how many planets exist in the universe (without scepticism about our knowledge of astronomy in general).	Examples of how global scepticism has been expressed/reached: • Descartes' evil deceiver scenario: if we can't know whether there is such a deceiver, then it seems all our knowledge comes into question including, crucially, our knowledge of an external world of physical objects and knowledge of mathematics/geometry. • The brain-in-a-vat type scenario: if we can't know that we are not brains in vats we cannot know anything about the external world.

Notes:

- Local scepticism is not the same as normal incredulity and students need to take care not to conflate the two positions. To do so would constitute imprecision.
- Global scepticism can be, and has been, used as a synonym for 'external world scepticism', despite not being the most radical or hyperbolic form of global scepticism (because it does not cast doubt on logical and mathematical truths). Some students may refer to Descartes' dreaming argument/2nd wave of doubt to illustrate this, which is a form of global *empirical* scepticism. This is an acceptable understanding of global scepticism and should be credited accordingly.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 4 Explain Leibniz's innatism and **one** of Locke's arguments against this position.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Leibniz's innatism:

- Concept innatism: Leibniz's innatism denies that the mind is a tabula rasa (empty slate) which receives all its 'ideas' (concepts) from sensory experiences. Leibniz argues that we are "innate to ourselves", and that, by attending "to that what is within us", we find the innate ideas of: being, unity, substance, duration, change, action, perception, and pleasure.
- Referring to Descartes, Leibniz also argues that our idea of 'god' is innate.
- Knowledge innatism: Leibniz's innatism denies that all our knowledge is ultimately derived from sense-experience. Although sense-experiences may be necessary for some knowledge (eg as a trigger), sense-experiences cannot in these instances be sufficient for knowledge because they cannot (fully) justify the claim, and such knowledge must therefore be innate. According to Leibniz, knowledge of universal/necessary truths is an example of innate knowledge as sense-experiences can only give us knowledge of particular/contingent instances.
- Referring to Plato, Leibniz argues that mathematical knowledge is innate.
- Innate principles: Leibniz's innatism denies that our mind is passive and merely receives empirical inputs. Our mind plays an active role in structuring our thinking by relying on innate principles such as the 'principle of contradiction'. The metaphor of the mind as a tabula rasa is therefore wrong.

- We have innate knowledge of certain principles. Even if our knowledge of these principles is not explicit/conscious but somehow implicit/subconscious/tacit, it still counts as (innate) knowledge. Leibniz suggests that knowledge of these principles are like “enthymemes” (rejecting Locke’s claim that innate knowledge must be conscious).
- Students may well utilise Leibniz famous ‘veined marble’ analogy to outline his position, and the stronger responses will recognise that it is an analogy and not an argument.
- Students should be careful when it comes to universal consent as Leibniz specifically states that his argument for innatism does not rely on there being universal consent (given the above point about unconscious knowledge/tacit consent). But for Locke, as we will see, innatism is undermined by the absence of universal consent.

Locke’s arguments against this position:

- Locke pre-dates Leibniz. The student is therefore not asked to entertain the question chronologically but to consider how Locke could have applied the arguments he gives in the anthology text. Locke gives a number of relevant arguments and different authors/textbooks will identify and name them differently.
- Locke argues that it is redundant to postulate innate concepts/knowledge:
 - “Some people regard it as settled that there are in the understanding certain innate principles. These are conceived as primary notions – letters printed on the mind of man, so to speak – which the soul receives when it first comes into existence, and that it brings into the world with it. I could show any fair-minded reader that this is wrong if I could show (as I hope to do in the present work) how men can get all the knowledge they have, and can arrive at certainty about some things, purely by using their natural faculties, without help from any innate notions or principles. Everyone will agree, presumably, that it would be absurd to suppose that the *ideas* of colours are innate in a creature to whom God has given eyesight, which is a power to get those ideas through the eyes from external objects. It would be equally unreasonable to explain our knowledge of various *truths* in terms of innate ‘imprinting’ if it could just as easily be explained through our ordinary abilities to come to know things” (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1690, Book 1, Chapter 2).
- Locke argues that there is no need to postulate innate ‘ideas’ (concepts) as we can explain how we gained those ideas from empirical experience, ie innatism is redundant. Leibniz is right to suggest that ideas such as ‘being,’ ‘unity’ etc can be gained from observing ourselves (‘internal sense’, ‘reflection’). However, that doesn’t show that those ideas are innate. Rather, it shows that the power to acquire those ideas is innate.
- Furthermore, we cannot identify an innate power to acquire ideas with innate ideas. To do so would be to commit ourselves to claim that ALL our ideas, even ideas that we clearly acquire from sense-perception such as ideas of colour, are innate. This is clearly absurd.
- The same is true for claims about innate knowledge. We have an innate ability to reason and subsequently gain knowledge, but this innate ability cannot be conflated with innate knowledge, lest ALL of our knowledge be innate, which is absurd.
- Locke argues that it will not do to say that innate knowledge can be subconscious because subconscious knowledge is “near a contradiction”. Some students may refer to Locke believing that the mind is ‘transparent’, although they should be careful not to commit Locke to the crude belief that we must be aware of all the contents of our minds (at all times), which would exclude things like memory. As Locke says, “No proposition can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of” (ibid), which clearly allows for some truths to be stored in the mind via memory.
- Locke also argues that ‘the argument from universal consent’, which purportedly is an argument in favour of innatism, is actually an argument against innatism. Locke’s reasoning is as follows:

- According to the argument from universal consent, universal consent entails innate knowledge.
- Eg universal consent with respect to the principles “whatever is, is” and “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be” entails that the knowledge of these principles is innate.
- However, there is no universal consent.
- Eg “children and idiots” have “no thought – not an inkling – of these principles”.
- Therefore, there is no innate knowledge.

Notes:

- Students may contextualise the question within the wider ‘empiricism vs rationalism’ debate and characterise Leibniz as a rationalist who argues for the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, whereas Locke is an empiricist who argues that all concepts and knowledge come (ultimately) from experience. It is important, however, that the students focus on the particular question of innatism and that any contextualisation doesn’t detract from the clarity of the answer to this question.
- In their explanation of Leibniz, students may draw on some of the ideas of Plato (or other innatists) but they should remain focused on Leibniz rather explaining other innatist arguments (eg Plato’s ‘slave boy’ argument’) in place of Leibniz’ arguments/position.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 5 Is indirect realism convincing?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students will likely begin by explaining indirect realism (IR), which can be most clearly split up into the following claims (especially for the purposes of evaluation):

1. REALISM claim: Mind-independent objects and their (primary) properties exist.
2. SENSE-DATA claim: We immediately perceive mind-dependent sense-data and their properties rather than these mind-independent objects and their properties.
3. REPRESENTATION claim: Our non-physical sense-data (normally/can) represent these physical mind-independent objects and their properties (at least to some extent) (meaning that we indirectly perceive them). Students may explain this in terms of the primary/secondary quality distinction, although there is no requirement for them to do so.
4. CAUSATION claim: Our non-physical sense-data are (in the end) caused by these physical mind-independent objects and their properties (ie by their effects on our physical bodies/brains).

Convincing:

- IR is convincing as one or more of the following arguments are successful:
 - The argument from illusion.
 - The argument from perceptual variation.
 - The argument from hallucination.
 - The time-lag argument.
 - Students may discuss responses to these arguments from alternative theories of perception (most likely direct realism) and consider to what extent we can avoid the indirect realist conclusion (eg by discussing relational properties of objects and/or challenging the phenomenal principle).
- IR is convincing as we need to draw a distinction between primary and secondary qualities (Locke), which entails IR. Stronger answers will make it clear what the *epistemological* relevance of this distinction is for indirect realism – eg by showing how it entails that we can know features of the external world in terms of the resemblance between our ideas of primary qualities and the primary qualities of mind-independent objects.
- IR is convincing as the existence of the external world can never be more than a hypothesis (Russell), which entails IR.

Unconvincing: Broadly metaphysical/ontological objections:

- IR faces problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) represent mind-independent objects (there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of representation – this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content and/or Berkeley's 'likeness principle').

- IR faces problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) are caused by mind-independent objects (there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of causation – this may be linked to questions about mind-body causation and so put as an anti-dualist and pro-materialist argument).
- Other problems associated with sense-data: location issues (where are they?), and the issue of indeterminacy (the speckled hen problem).

Unconvincing: Broadly epistemological objections:

- IR faces issues of scepticism about the existence and nature of the external world (the ‘veil of perception’).
- In addition, it appears introspectively (a phenomenological point) that we are aware of mind-independent objects (the ‘transparency’ of experience); statements about external mind-independent objects are irreducible to statements about ‘mere’ experiences.
 - Indirect realists can respond that good inductive support can be given for the existence of the external world:
 - Locke’s argument from the involuntary nature of our experience.
 - The argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Locke and Catharine Trotter Cockburn (attrib).
 - Russell’s response that the external world is the ‘best hypothesis’.

Unconvincing: Berkeley’s arguments against IR:

- Berkeley’s ‘Master’ argument (and other arguments he gives) can be interpreted as demonstrating that we cannot have a meaningful or coherent concept of anything mind-independent (and it may therefore follow that such objects are impossible).
- Berkeley’s attack on the Primary/Secondary Quality distinction: his argument that all properties are mind-dependent. (Of course, this only applies to versions of IR that embrace this distinction, eg Locke).
- Berkeley’s attack on IR via the ‘likeness principle’.

Unconvincing: Direct realist arguments against IR:

- The argument from parsimony (Ockham’s razor): a philosophical account that doesn’t have two ontological levels such as sense-data (mind-dependent objects) and physical objects (mind-independent objects) is better.
- We can explain illusion and perceptual variation at the level of physical objects in terms of relational properties of physical objects. Therefore, the arguments from illusion and perceptual variation do not prove IR and the ontologically simpler direct realist’s explanation is better.
- Some students may link the above point (or equally develop this independently) to J.L. Austin’s (common-sense/ordinary language) criticisms of sense-datum theories and the unnecessary metaphysical complications associated with ‘reification’ – ie turning appearances into actual objects.
- We can explain the time-lag of perception in terms of physical properties/processes. Therefore, the argument from time-lag does not prove IR and the ontologically simpler direct realist’s explanation is therefore better.
- We can deny that hallucination is an example of perception and hence deny that it entails an IR account of perception.

Somewhat convincing:

- The immediate objects of perception are sometimes but not always mind-dependent:
 - ie arguing for a (metaphysical) disjunctivism in which illusions and/or hallucinations do have sense-data as immediate objects of perception but veridical perception does not.

- Doing so by attacking the ‘common factor principle’ in arguments from illusion and hallucination, ie denying that subjectively indistinguishable experiences must involve immediate perception of the same kind of object.

Notes:

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make): the primary focus is on understanding (AO1) and evaluation (AO2). Eg persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be a form of inaccuracy that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

Section B – Moral philosophy

0 6 What, for Aristotle, is the difference between voluntary and involuntary actions?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Aristotle defines a voluntary action as an action done knowingly (the ‘epistemic condition’) and originating from us (the ‘control condition’).
 - The hallmark of voluntary actions is that we are praised or blamed for them.
- Aristotle defines involuntary actions as actions that are not voluntary because we are not the agent of the action, either because we have been compelled (so failing to meet the ‘control condition’ - eg if I fall and knock someone over, my fall is involuntary if the wind blew me over) or it is done out of ignorance (so failing to meet the ‘epistemic condition’ - eg Oedipus killed his father without knowing he was his father).
 - The hallmark of involuntary actions is that we are pardoned or pitied for them rather than praised or blamed and feel regret/feel remorse about performing them (see below).

Examples for 3 marks

Answers that gain 3 marks will be clear and precise on the difference between both types of action (either explicitly or implicitly). Below are 2 examples, but any legitimate way of explaining the distinction should be credited if students demonstrate that they understand the difference. Example 1 focuses on the ‘control’ and ‘epistemic’ conditions spelt out in relation to both types of actions. Example 2 picks out the difference in terms of the ‘hallmarks’ pertaining to the broader notion of responsibility (which could also include praise, blame, pity and/or regret), plus one other condition (eg in this example it is the ‘epistemic condition’, but it could equally have been the ‘control condition’).

- Example 1: ‘Voluntary actions are done intentionally by agents who are not compelled (by an external force) and they are aware of the facts about what it is they are doing. Whereas involuntary actions are either compelled or carried out in ignorance (of the relevant facts).’
- Example 2: ‘Voluntary actions are those that are done knowingly, making us morally responsible for them. In contrast, involuntary actions are those that are done out of ignorance and which we are not held morally responsible for (but we may be pitied and/or fear remorse).’

Examples for 2 marks

Answers that gain 2 marks will typically demonstrate an understanding of the difference but less precisely (example 1); and/or the response could have been fuller (example 2).

- Example 1: ‘Voluntary actions are those that we do ourselves and which we are aware of, whereas involuntary actions are those that we do not choose because we are forced to do them and are unaware’.
- Example 2: ‘Voluntary actions are actions that we have control over, whereas involuntary actions are ones that we don’t have control over due to force or ignorance.’

Examples for 1 mark

Answers that gain 1 mark might be clear on one aspect of the question only (example 1) or demonstrate a partial or imprecise understanding of the difference (example 2).

- Example 1: ‘Voluntary actions are actions that we intentionally do (eg purposefully standing on someone’s foot). Involuntary actions are actions that we do not regret doing (eg stepping on someone’s foot and not caring).’
- Example 2: ‘Voluntary actions are those that we choose whereas involuntary actions are ones that we don’t choose.’

Notes:

- The distinction between voluntary and involuntary is nuanced and some actions are ‘mixed’. The merchants who throw goods overboard to save their lives and their ship act knowingly, and the action originates from them, so their action is voluntary, but they would not have chosen this action ‘in itself’ but are forced to do it because of the storm, so their action is also involuntary. Identifying some actions as ‘mixed’ should not count as redundancy if the students’ main focus is on the voluntary/involuntary distinction.
- Aristotle also discusses non-voluntary actions, where these are actions done out of ignorance but for which we feel no remorse when we realise what has been done. Students need to be careful not to conflate/confuse involuntary actions with non-voluntary actions. Distinguishing involuntary actions from non-voluntary actions should not count as redundancy, as long as the students’ main focus is on the voluntary/involuntary distinction.
- Although unlikely, some students may distinguish ‘voluntary’ actions from ‘intentional’ actions, as, according to Aristotle, intentional actions always involve rational deliberation (and so are a subset of voluntary actions) but not all voluntary actions are necessarily intentional – eg spontaneously batting away a fly is voluntary in that it originates in us and we do it knowingly, but it does not involve rational deliberation, and so is not intentional. This should be credited accordingly, although students should also be credited for explaining voluntary actions in terms of intentional actions.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 7 Explain the difference between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students are likely to make some of the following points:

- It is likely that (some) students will answer the question through the prism of Bentham and Mill, with Bentham as an act utilitarian and Mill as a rule utilitarian. However, to progress into the higher levels, students need to focus on the difference between act and rule utilitarianism as opposed to simply explaining the differences between Bentham and Mill more generally (eg in terms of quantitative and qualitative versions of utilitarianism).
- Act utilitarianism (also known as direct utilitarianism) argues that moral rightness/goodness is best defined in terms of the consequences of individual actions on a case by case basis. Eg classical hedonic act utilitarianism will argue that an action is morally right/good in so far as it brings about the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest amount of people in this particular instance.
- Rule utilitarianism (also known as indirect utilitarianism) argues that moral rightness/goodness is best defined in terms of the consequences of following rules/a rule that belongs to a set of rules. Eg an action is morally right/good if it is done in accordance with a rule that belongs to a set of rules which, if everybody were to follow it, would lead to the greatest amount of utility for the greatest amount of people in the long run.
- Students may explain the difference between act and rule utilitarianism by giving examples of how an individual action, eg stealing or lying, which brings about the greatest amount of utility in a particular instance (and so is a morally right course of action for the act utilitarian) would not bring about the greatest amount of utility in the long run if it were to become a rule (and so is not the morally right course of action for a rule utilitarian).
- Student may also explain the difference in terms of decision making procedures rather than in terms of moral rightness/goodness and this is fine.
- Students may draw a further distinction between weak and strong rule utilitarianism. This is not necessary but should not count as a redundancy either.

Students might also point out that:

- An act utilitarian may argue that rule utilitarianism is unsustainable because it either amounts to 'rule worship' and thereby becomes a kind of deontology or it collapses into act utilitarianism.

- A rule utilitarian may argue that act utilitarianism cannot account for some of the most basic moral concepts such as fairness, liberty, and rights, and that it thereby either fails as a moral theory or turns into rule utilitarianism.

NB: This should not be counted as redundant evaluation, as this would be a case of showing how/why the two versions of utilitarianism are susceptible to different criticisms.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 8 Explain what Aristotle means by 'eudaimonia'.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Expect some of the following points:

- Eudaimonia is a state exclusive to human beings and is defined as “living well and doing well.”
- Because Aristotle defines eudaimonia in terms of fulfilling one’s capabilities/roles/function (ergon), eudaimonia is sometimes translated as ‘flourishing’.
- Answers that identify eudaimonia as ‘human flourishing’ and then go on to develop their explanations by making logical connections to other features of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia (see the points below) should be awarded at least 3 marks for an answer that is substantively correct. Students should then be awarded marks in the higher levels according to the levels of precision and fullness of their response.
- Answers that only identify eudaimonia as ‘human flourishing’ but do not then go on to explain this in further detail will not have met the substantive requirements of the question (which is to ‘explain’ rather than merely ‘state’) and so would not typically get more than 2 marks.
- For Aristotle, the term encompasses not only a moral sense of goodness, but it also denotes success (material wealth, status, achievements, high offices held within the city-state).
- Eudaimonia is ‘an end in itself’. It is an intrinsic good as opposed to an instrumental good.
- As an intrinsic good, eudaimonia is desirable for its own sake rather than for the sake of something else.
- However, since there are many activities and goods which are ends in themselves, eudaimonia stands out as the highest of those ends and is the ultimate or final end.
- Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia in terms of the final or ultimate end (telos = end) makes his account of eudaimonia ‘teleological’.
- As the final/ultimate end, eudaimonia is ‘self-sufficient’. However, that does not entail that a person who lives the life of eudaimonia is self-sufficient. People are by nature social and ‘political’, therefore our eudaimonia depends on the eudaimonia of our family, friends, and fellow citizens.
- Eudaimonia is to be understood in terms of a whole life well lived. It is not a psychological or biological state a person can possess piecemeal or periodically.
- Aristotle defines eudaimonia in terms of fulfilling one’s biological, psychological, and societal capabilities/roles/functions (ergon) well, and to do so from a settled disposition of an excellent/

virtuous character (students may here refer to the ancient Greek term ‘arete’ and translate it as either ‘virtue’ or as ‘excellence’).

- Virtue/excellence is to be cultivated through reflective/mindful practice similarly to how you develop a skill (techne).
- Since ‘practical reason’ (phronesis) forms an integral part of a person’s biological, psychological and societal function, it is important for Aristotle that eudaimonia is defined in terms thereof.
- Part of eudaimonia – “living well and doing well” - is that the person learns to take pleasure in the right things. Since the eudaimon person chooses to do the right thing from a settled disposition of virtue and practical wisdom, eudaimonia will entail living a pleasant life, but it will not be a life lived for the sake of pleasure.
- Because Aristotle understands eudaimonia in terms of a pleasant life, eudaimonia is sometimes translated as ‘happiness’ on the assumption that pleasure brings about happiness.
- In Book 10 (*Nicomachean Ethics*), Aristotle defines eudaimonia as living a life of contemplation.

Notes:

- There is a scholarly debate as to whether eudaimonia as ‘the ultimate/final end’ is to be construed as a ‘dominant end’ or an ‘inclusive end’. The dominant end reading suggests that eudaimonia mainly consists of one single activity: contemplation. The inclusive end reading suggests that eudaimonia is composed of many excellent/virtuous activities guided by practical wisdom. Since the interpretation of whether eudaimonia is to be understood as a dominant end or an inclusive end is contested, students who favour one interpretation over the other should not be penalised.
- Students who identify eudaimonia as a dominant end of a life lived in contemplation are likely to characterise the life of eudaimonia as ‘godlike’ as Aristotle defines good in terms of contemplation and are likely to put less emphasis on friendship and practical wisdom.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 0 9** Explain Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative **and** explain the issue that not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Kant's first formulation:

- Students may explain more generally what a 'categorical imperative' is (perhaps distinguishing them from hypothetical imperatives) before explaining Kant's first formulation.
- The first formulation of the categorical imperative is used as a way of deriving more specific duties and is stated thus: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 1785, 4:421).
- Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test (ie cannot be so willed) is morally wrong. Students may define a maxim 'as an intention that guides you in choosing your actions.'
- Maxims that pass this test (ie can be so willed) are morally permissible (NB: they are not morally obligatory).
- A maxim fails the test of the categorical imperative if universalising it leads to a contradiction.
- There are two types of contradictions that Kant discusses:
 - a contradiction in conception (a logical contradiction) which leads to perfect duties (which are duties to never do X). Eg 'Don't commit suicide!' and 'Don't make false promises!'
 - a contradiction in the will (ie they contradict something that we rationally must will) which leads to imperfect duties (which are duties to do Y to at least some extent). Eg 'Develop your talents!' and 'Help others!'

Explain the issue that not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral:

Students may argue that not all universal maxims are distinctly moral because (1) they are trivial or (2) because they are immoral.

- (1) Many universalisable maxims are trivial (as argued by MacIntyre): We can universalise trivial maxims, eg 'always eat mussels on Mondays in March' without any contradiction in conception/will occurring. This suggests that universalisability trivialises morality and fails to ground it.
- (2) Many universalisable maxims are immoral. If we specify a particular set of circumstances in our maxim, eg 'steal, but only from philosophers who have a 'z' in their first name and write about epistemology,' we can universalise it without any contradiction in conception/will occurring. This suggests that universalisability fails to ground morality.
- This could be seen as problematic because Kant intended the universalisation test to identify our moral duties (which is impacted by example 1) and to filter out immoral actions (which is impacted by example 2). As such, the first formulation of the categorical imperative does not clearly distinguish moral from non-moral or immoral actions/maxims.
- Some students may explain the 2nd point – ie that some universalisable maxims are immoral – but do so by illustrating this point using examples like the mad axeman. For example, the maxim 'Never lie' is universalisable, but in this case, telling the truth enables a murder. This suggests that a maxim can pass the universalisability test and still lead to an outcome that is (obviously) morally wrong.
- Although this objection is consequentialist in nature and so does not directly engage with Kant's internal logic, it still raises a challenge for his first formulation of the categorical imperative. As such, this line of reasoning should be credited, depending on how clearly and effectively it is explained and integrated into the student's response.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

1 0 Are moral realists right to claim that mind-independent moral facts/properties exist?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students are likely to contextualise the question into a wider meta-ethical debate related to moral language.
 - Eg mind-independent moral properties exist, and moral language is therefore truth-apt and can be used to make true claims that affirm the existence of them.
 - Eg mind-independent moral properties exist, and moral judgements are made true or false by them.

There are many theories that might be considered to argue in favour of the existence of mind-independent moral properties, and it is possible that students might give them as examples:

- Eg naturalist realist views (eg some versions of utilitarianism and virtue ethics) and non-naturalist views (eg intuitionism, divine command theory (arguably), Platonism).
- There may also be versions of contractarian views which defend the existence of mind-independent moral properties.

Conclusions may be drawn from the following:

YES: mind-independent moral properties exist.

- This may be done by, in the end, supporting/defending a particular version (or some versions) of moral realism...
- ...or by defending it in general but with particular versions being employed as **examples** of how moral realists might fill out their account...
- ...or by defending it in general with no reference to any particular versions of moral realism.

NO: mind-independent moral properties do not exist.

- This may be done by arguing that prominent versions of moral realism fail to adequately respond to issues...
- ...and/or by arguing that a particular version of moral anti-realism succeeds (either a cognitivist version (eg error theory) or a non-cognitivist version (eg emotivism)...
- ...or by arguing that there are general issues that cannot (in general) be responded to by moral realists.

Arguments against the existence of mind-independent moral properties:

- Mackie's argument from relativity: widespread and intractable moral disagreement (and a lack of a procedure by which we can resolve it) is best explained by the falsity of moral realism (and therefore moral realism is (probably) false). In response, one might argue that:
 - there is more agreement than Mackie implies;
 - the disagreement is about the non-moral facts rather than the moral facts;
 - there is disagreement in other areas that we may be realists about (eg scientific disagreement);

- that disagreement can be explained by people having inferior access to mind-independent moral properties.
- Mackie's argument/s from queerness: mind-independent moral properties, if they existed, would be metaphysically 'queer' (and knowledge of them would therefore require such an epistemologically 'queer' faculty) - ie they would be completely different to any other property that we have reason to believe exist – and so it is implausible that they exist (and so implausible that moral realism is true). In response one might argue that:
 - this would also support a non-naturalist realist position;
 - this would also support the view that there must be natural moral properties of a 'queer' sort that cannot be reduced to non-moral natural properties (ie non-reductive moral naturalism);
 - there are other properties that have similar characteristics, eg painfulness/pleasurableness.
- Hume's Fork: moral propositions are neither relations of ideas nor matters of fact, therefore moral knowledge is impossible (and so moral realism is false).
- A J Ayer's verification principle: moral sentences are neither analytically true (or false) nor can they be verified by experience, therefore they are not cognitively meaningful (and so moral realism, a cognitivist view, is false).
- Hume's 'is-ought' gap: propositions about morality ('ought' statements) cannot be legitimately deduced from propositions about what is the case ('is' statements) (and so moral realism, is false, assuming that propositions about facts/properties are all 'is' statements).
- Hume's argument that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us (arguably) opposes cognitivism (and so opposes any cognitivist forms of moral realism).
 - In response, one could be an externalist about moral motivation.

Arguments supporting the existence of mind-independent properties:

- The existence of mind-independent moral properties is that which best explains the ways in which we use moral language, including moral reasoning, persuading, disagreeing etc – ie it is unlikely that such widespread commitments and practices would exist if there were no truth to moral claims (eg when people disagree it is because they think there are facts that would settle the disagreement).
- To deny the existence of mind-independent moral properties is to deny implausibly that there can be such a thing as moral progress (eg that it is not morally better if there is less prejudice against women).
- One might argue (pace Mackie) that there is agreement about moral claims and that this counts in favour of the existence of mind-independent moral properties: very many common basic moral principles exist across societies.
- Phenomenology: one might argue that we perceive that certain acts (eg torture) are wrong.

Notes:

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make): the primary focus is on understanding (AO1) and evaluation (AO2). Eg persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be a form of inaccuracy that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
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