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A-level  
**PHILOSOPHY**  
**7172/2**

Paper 2 The metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind

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Mark scheme

June 2024

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Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

No student should be disadvantaged on the basis of their gender identity and/or how they refer to the gender identity of others in their exam responses.

A consistent use of 'they/them' as a singular and pronouns beyond 'she/her' or 'he/him' will be credited in exam responses in line with existing mark scheme criteria.

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## Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

### Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

### Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

## Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

**Section A**

**Metaphysics of God**

**0 1** What does it mean to say that God is (a) ‘omniscient’ and (b) ‘omnipotent’?

**[3 marks]**

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

Two attributes of God are in focus here. Students may place these within the context of the wider set of (classical) attributes of God (who may be defined, for example, as a ‘supremely perfect being’). This is certainly not necessary, but students should not be penalised for redundancy if they take this approach.

Most students will probably refer to ‘God’, but others may refer to ‘divine being’, ‘supreme being’, ‘being’, or ‘entity’. They may also use various pronouns. This does not matter, so long as it is clear that these qualities are being attributed (to God) and not simply terms that are defined in the abstract.

**(a) Omniscient:** here are some ways in which God's omniscience might be understood:

- God knows all true propositions.
- God knows everything that it is (logically) possible to know.
- God has maximal knowledge in the sense that God’s knowledge is not exceeded by any other (possible) being (and is consistent with God’s other attributes).
- God has unlimited (or infinite) knowledge.
- God possesses perfect knowledge.

There is no expectation for the term ‘knowledge’ itself to be defined here.

**(b) Omnipotent:** here are some ways in which God's omnipotence might be understood:

- God can perform all actions / bring about all states of affairs (that are logically possible).
- God has maximal power in the sense that God’s power is not exceeded by any other (possible) being (and is consistent with God’s other attributes).
- God has unlimited power (or infinite) power.
- God possesses perfect power.

There is no expectation for the term ‘power’ itself to be defined here.

### **Distribution of marks**

- Responses awarded full marks will provide definitions which meet the requirements of Level 3 on the generic mark scheme on both terms (see below for examples).
- Responses awarded 2 marks will either be substantively correct but not full on both attributes, or else precise and full on one attribute but imprecise or not full on the other (see below for examples).
- Responses awarded 1 mark will be correct on one attribute only, or show a limited grasp of both (see below for examples).

### Examples of 3-mark responses

- To say God is omniscient is to claim God knows all true propositions. And to say God is omnipotent is to claim that God can do anything it is (logically) possible to do.
- An omnipotent God is one who can perform all (logically) possible actions. An omniscient God is one who knows everything that it is (logically) possible to know.
- To say God is omniscient is to say that there is a being who has unlimited (or infinite) knowledge, and to say God is omnipotent to say there is a being who has unlimited (or infinite) power.

### Examples of 2-mark responses

- a) God is all knowing. b) God is all powerful.
- To claim God is omniscient is to claim God knows all true propositions, and to say God is omnipotent is to say that God is all powerful.
- To claim that God is omniscient is to say that God is all seeing. To say that God is omnipotent is to say God can do anything that is (logically) possible.

NB: If students adopt the first approach in these examples of 2-mark responses, it is important that they label the terms ('a' or 'b') correctly. If the response gets them the wrong way round, but the definitions are substantively correct, they can be awarded 1 mark, and that rule holds whether they label them 'a' or 'b' or not (ie they give substantively correct definitions but get the terms the wrong way round).

### Examples of 1-mark responses

- To say that God is omniscient means God has great knowledge, and to say God is omnipotent is to say that God has great power.
- To say that God is omniscient means that God is all seeing. To say God is omnipotent is to say God is all powerful.
- To say that God is omnipotent means that God has the power to do anything that is logically possible to do. To say that God is omniscient means that God is present everywhere.

As exemplified above, students awarded maximum marks will go beyond saying that the key terms mean that 'God is all knowing' and 'God is all powerful', giving a fuller and more precise explanation. But it is not necessary for students to detail the contested interpretations of these attributes. For example, if a student defines 'omnipotence' as 'the claim that God can do everything that it is logically possible to do', they do not need to give the most obvious competing version (ie 'that God can do absolutely anything'). But if students do give alternative interpretations of these concepts, and those alternatives are correct (as illustrated above), do not penalise for redundancy.

### **Notes:**

- Students who restrict God's power or knowledge to the 'metaphysical' realm fall short of the precision necessary for maximum marks to be awarded, but they can get to Level 2 if the rest

of their answer is clear and correct. If they do this on both attribute, they can only get to Level 1.

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 2** Explain Descartes' version of the cosmological argument based on his continuing existence. **[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

### Indicative content

- This argument from Descartes appears in the *Meditations* (specifically in Meditation 3).
- Cosmological arguments are arguments for the existence of God as the one unique (first) cause/explanation of some proposed fact about reality – in this case, the fact that Descartes' own mind (containing an idea of God) exists and continues to exist through time (unlike other cosmological argument, this is not based on features of the external/physical world).
- It is worth saying that the argument has multiple parts to it and although it is set out in standard form below for the purposes of clarity, it is not so clearly structured in the original text. Descartes takes a scatter-gun approach, thinking there are multiple overlapping reasons why other explanations of my existence do not work, and God is the only adequate explanation. Furthermore, it is not always the case that the premises (as added below) work together to establish the conclusion – some of the premises (either one or more) below, therefore, if true, seem to establish the conclusion without the need for the other premises. All of this might mean that students, understandably, present it in multiple ways.

NB: Students awarded maximum marks will explicitly connect Descartes' cosmological argument to his **continued** existence (this is, indeed, the foundation for it), rather than just his mere 'existence'. Responses which manage to do this implicitly (eg by considering but rejecting the possibility that Descartes has 'always existed') may get to 4 marks (assuming the explanation is otherwise clear and correct with logical links).

- Here is a version of the argument that Descartes gives:
  - P1: I exist as a being from one moment to the next (with an idea of a supremely perfect being).
  - P2: I cannot be the cause of myself as I would have made myself perfect (ie I would be God) and I know I am not.

- P3: Even if I had always existed (and so didn't need a cause of the beginning of my existence), the fact that I continue to exist from one moment to the next would still require a cause.
- P4: I cannot be the cause of my continued existence because...
  - ...if I had the power to do this I would know that I had such power (since I am nothing but a thinking thing)...
  - ...but I do not know that I have such power and so do not have this power.
- P5: No other finite being (eg my parents) could be the ultimate cause of my continued existence as:
  - (a) they (my parents) do not keep me in existence from moment to moment;
  - (b) this could not give an ultimate explanation of the fact that I have an idea of God that I have (even if they, with their idea of God, caused me with mine, we could then still ask where their idea of God came from, and this cannot continue forever - not just because this is not possible, but also because we need a cause that sustains me in existence at each moment);
  - and (c) they (my parents) only brought my physical body into existence (assuming this is true, which has not yet been established at this point in the *Meditations*), not me as (essentially) a thinking thing.
- [P6: My continued existence cannot be the result of various separate non-divine causes and must be, rather, one being (because the idea of God that I have includes God's simplicity: the inseparability of God's attributes / the doctrine that God is without parts).
- C1: Therefore, the only possible cause of my continued existence (as a being with the idea of a supremely perfect being in my mind) is one supremely perfect being (ie God).
- C2: Therefore, God must exist.

NB: Descartes' argument is not concerned with the validity of 'necessary/contingent' causes of his **continued** existence, but with **perfect/imperfect** causes. But if students mention God's 'necessity' alongside God's 'perfection' (with the former taken to be implicit in the latter) students should not be penalised.

- There are two (related) important points to make:
  - (1) Some of the argument above is not related explicitly to the **continued** existence of one's mind. With such a tricky passage of overlapping points in the text, students can write about any of the content above without this counting as redundancy, so long as they do address why God must be the explanation of the **continuing** existence of one's mind.
  - (2) In the text at the point at which Descartes explains what is P5 (a) above, he references his previous argument for God as the cause of his idea of God (what is known as the 'Trademark' argument). Given that there is already a lot of content above for students to explain, it is not expected that they explain this argument as well, and, arguably, it is less relevant to the **continuing** existence of Descartes' mind (see above). Nonetheless, students may explain it and this is not to be seen as redundancy. This is the argument that you may see explained (where P4-C4 is sometimes referred to as the 'Trademark' argument):
    - P1: I have an idea of God as a supremely perfect being within my mind.
    - P2: All of our ideas come from our senses, or they are invented by us, or they are innate.
    - P3: My idea of God cannot have come from my senses (it has not come to me unexpectedly as other ideas from my senses do), and I could not have invented the idea myself (because I can't add to or take away from the idea unlike other ideas I have invented).
    - C1: Therefore my idea of God is innate.
    - P4: There must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect (and this applies to the reality represented within ideas just as it does to actual objects/events: the 'causal adequacy principle').

- C2: Therefore, only a supremely perfect being (ie God) could be the cause of my idea of God.
- C3: Therefore, God must exist.
  - Note that P1 and P4 would be enough by themselves to establish C2/3, and students might well present this shorter version.

NB: Students who go beyond Level 3 will relate the details of the ‘Trademark’ argument (should they address it) to Descartes’ **continued** existence (as a thinking thing with the idea of God) - explicitly so for Level 5.

**Notes:**

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 0 3** Explain how an empiricist might object to the ontological argument as an a priori proof for God’s existence.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

Students may begin by outlining/summarising the ontological argument in general terms (as an a priori and deductive argument from the idea/conception of God to the existence of God), or a specific version (see below). This is not required so long as their explanation of the objection demonstrates their knowledge of key features of this family of arguments for the existence of God.

Ontological arguments

- If students do refer to a specific version it is likely they will draw on key features of the following:
  - Anselm: I/we have an idea of God as a being greater than which nothing can be conceived; it is greater to exist in reality than in the mind only; if God existed in the mind only, there would be a being greater than which nothing can be conceived (a real one), which is absurd; therefore God must exist.
  - Descartes: I/we have an (innate) idea of God as a supremely perfect being; a supremely perfect being includes all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore God must exist.
  - Malcolm: our idea of God is that of an unlimited being, which would include necessary existence; the exists of such a being is either necessary or impossible; the existence of such a being is not impossible; therefore it is necessary that such a being (God) exists.

Empiricist objection(s)

- It is likely that students will answer this from the general perspective of Hume’s ‘Fork’ which is typical of the classical empiricist view on a posteriori and a priori knowledge claims, their nature/content, and how they are justified.
- According to Hume’s ‘Fork’ knowledge can be split into two fundamental and mutually exclusive kinds (NB: not all the terms below are used by Hume himself, and it is possible for students to make the point in terms of ‘meaning’ rather than ‘knowledge’):
  - ‘Matters of fact’:
    - knowledge of matters of fact is a posteriori (justified using experience);
    - the truths themselves are *synthetic* truths (not true by definition but rather are substantial truths about reality);

- the truths themselves are *contingent* truths (true in the actual world, but not true in all possible worlds; their contrary is not a contradiction);
  - one can conceive of them being false.
- ‘Relations of ideas’:
  - knowledge of relations of ideas is a priori (justified on some basis other than experience);
  - the truths themselves are *analytic* truths (true by definition and not substantial truths about reality);
  - the truths themselves are *necessary* truths (true in all possible worlds; their contrary is a contradiction);
  - one cannot conceive of them being false.
- Empiricism (classical) consists of the following claims (the first two of which are most relevant here):
  - (1) All a priori knowledge is of analytic truths.
  - (2) All knowledge of synthetic truths is a posteriori.
  - (3) There are no innate ideas and no innate truths/knowledge.
- Accordingly, there are two ways of explaining what is really the same overall point:
  - (1) If the conclusion of the argument, ‘God exists’, is (or seems to be) making a genuine claim about the actual existence of a being (ie a synthetic truth) then (the empiricist will argue) it is a ‘matter of fact’ and, as such, we can conceive of it being false without contradiction. If true it would be contingently true, and any justification for it would therefore have to be a posteriori (using experience). This seems to be Hume’s point in the extract below:
    - Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: *“There is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate [ie give a deductively valid proof of] a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable.”*
    - Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: *“It seems to me, that the only objects of...demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion.....All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever is may not be...The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct [a proposition] as its existence.....The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely on experience.”*
  - (2) If the argument is a priori (as the proponents claim) and sound/valid, then (argues the empiricist) the conclusion cannot contain anything that was not already in the premises. In this case the conclusion of the argument should be understood as stating (or having proved) nothing more than the following hypothetical proposition which is tautological/analytically true and necessarily true: ‘If there is a God, then God exists’ (or ‘If God exists, God exists necessarily’). If ‘existence’ is part of the meaning of the term ‘God’, then this statement has to be true, but it is not a synthetic matter of fact, but rather a mere ‘relation of ideas’ in Hume’s terms. This is the way that Russell puts this rendering of the empiricist objection:
    - Problems of Philosophy: *“There is another point of great importance, in which the empiricists were in the right as against the rationalists. Nothing can be known to exist except by the help of experience.... Rationalists believed that, from general considerations as to what must be, they could deduce the existence of this or that in the actual world. In this belief they seem to have been mistaken. All the knowledge that we can acquire a priori concerning existence seems to be [merely] hypothetical: it tells us that if one thing exists, another must exist, or, more generally, that if one proposition is true another must be true....Thus the scope and power of a priori principles is strictly limited. All knowledge that something exists must be in part dependent on experience. When anything is known*

*immediately, its existence is known by experience alone; Knowledge is called empirical when it rests wholly or partly upon experience. Thus all knowledge which asserts existence is empirical, and the only a priori knowledge concerning existence is hypothetical, giving connections among things that exist or may exist, but not giving actual existence.”*

- Students may put this objection in the terms of the verification principle (à la logical positivism/empiricism) arguing that claims about God are neither synthetic/verifiable or analytic/tautological (as, for example, Ayer does).

NB: Students who approach this question by directly addressing the empiricist objection, without first giving an outline of the/an ontological argument, may very well present the ontological argument (implicitly at least) in a way that proponents of the ontological argument would not accept (eg presenting the ontological argument as ‘purely analytic’, or as a matter of ‘mere definition’). Students can still access the full range of marks in this case – as the focus of the question is on the empiricist objection - just so long as there are no outright misrepresentations of how the ontological argument is formulated by its advocates (eg by the relevant philosophers in the relevant texts on the Specification).

**Notes:**

- Although Kant is not listed on the Specification as an empiricist, it is possible for students to draw from aspects of Kant’s critique of ontological arguments which are consistent with and indicative of empiricist objections, but it is important that the empirical dimension is to the fore (eg be mindful of applications of the famous ‘existence is not a real predicate’ objection, which do not make an empirical point). The same would apply to the use of any other objections to the ontological argument.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 4** Explain the design argument as presented by Hume **and** his objection that it fails as it is an argument from a unique case.

**[12 marks]**

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

Explain the design argument as presented by Hume...

Students are being asked to explain a version of the design argument presented (but not accepted/endorsed) by Hume. He presents it for the purpose of then objecting to it (one such objection being part of this question).

The argument Hume presents has the following form (this is just one way of setting it out):

- P1: Human artefacts (eg, cameras, machines, organisations; Hume himself gives ‘watches’ and ‘knitting-looms’ as examples) have certain (‘teleological’) properties of design (‘spatial order’: ie complexity, order, parts working towards a purpose, etc).
- P2: Nature itself (ie the universe itself, plus natural entities within it) has these (‘teleological’) properties of design (‘spatial order’: ie complexity, order, parts working towards a purpose, etc).
- P3: We know human artefacts have these (‘teleological’) properties of design because they have been designed by an intelligent being.
- P4: Similar effects/properties typically have similar causes/explanations.
- C1: Therefore, nature/natural entities (probably) have these (‘teleological’) properties because they have been designed by an intelligent being (God).

This (the above) is the core of the argument. They can get full marks based on this if their answer meets the levels of response criteria. However, Hume's presented argument also includes the following argumentation:

- *P5: Natural entities are much more complicated than human artefacts.*
- *P6: This greater complexity requires greater intelligence.*
- *C2: Therefore an intelligent being/designer (probably) exists which has much greater intelligence than a human (ie God).*

Further points that might be mentioned:

- It is an **a posteriori** argument (ie an argument where at least one premise is a posteriori / justified on the basis of experience). This is because it begins (P1) with observations about the world.
- It is an **analogical** argument (an argument from analogy). It draws an analogy between the properties that human-made objects have and the properties found in nature/natural objects and uses this to conclude that they have a similar cause (ie a designer).
- It is a species of **inductive** argument, where this is understood as meaning arguments where the conclusion is [intended by the author to be] made probable by the premises, but not logically guaranteed.
  - NB: Students need not say explicitly that the existence of God is rendered 'probable', by this argument from analogy, to access the full range of mark. But they should not overstate the strength of the conclusion either (ie that this is intended to show that God 'must' or 'necessarily' exist). Having said that, if there is *occasional* slippage into the language of 'must', but the details of the argument are otherwise precise, and the explanation of the objection (see below) meet the required standards, this would not in itself be a decisive reason not to put the answer in the top band.
- Hume focuses on what Swinburne would later describe as '**spatial order**' or 'regularities of copresence'. This refers to patterns of order within something in space at one instant of time (eg the arrangements of the parts of the human body, the eye, or a cell) which allow a function to be performed. Students should not be penalised if this more modern terminology is used.
- In keeping with the spirit of the previous bullet point, there may be some (apparent) blurring with *analogical* and *inductive* interpretations of Paley's design argument. That is not a serious issue as there are similarities, and you can credit whatever is relevant to the substance of Hume's argument. But be mindful of wholesale confusions with Paley's argument (this will probably be most conspicuous if students produce a deductive interpretation of Paley).

and his objection that it fails as it is an argument from a unique case.

- Analogical arguments work by comparing one thing to something similar. However, Hume argues, there is nothing similar to the universe, there is only one universe and so no conclusions about its cause/origins can be legitimately drawn.
- This links to Hume's views on causation. That there is no a priori knowledge of causes, only a posteriori knowledge based on constant conjunction. But (i) we have had no experience of the origin of worlds and (ii) those things that we have had experience of the origins of are not similar enough.
  - As Hume puts it in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: "*But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art, like the human; because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite, that we had experience of the origin of worlds (=i) above; and it is not sufficient surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance ... (=ii) above - with reference to 2.18 where Hume says that you can't compare the universe to "houses, ships, furniture, machines...").*

- So the universe is unique – there are no other universes that we know to have been designed with which we can compare this universe.
  - Students may go on to say that:
    - Worse still, we only have experience of a small part of the universe, not even the whole of it. It is bad reasoning to assume that what explains how parts of nature work is a basis for judging the whole. This aside we know very little of the universe and cannot presume that “thought” is an active principle throughout the universe.
    - The objection might be supplemented by arguing that there is nothing sufficiently similar to the universe (ie human artefacts are not sufficiently similar - he gives a series of differences (eg, living vs. not, self-sustaining vs. not). However, this might be regarded as a separate argument, and is only creditworthy in so far as it is linked to the ‘unique case’ objection.
      - NB: The same applies to Hume’s other objections (eg those centring on the probability of multiple designers/gods, or those which concern the problem of evil). These are criticism of the argument from analogy, and limited credit can be given for students who know little else about that part of the question. But those progressing to the higher bands (7-9 and 10-12) will be exclusively (or at least prominently) focussed on the ‘single case’ objection.
- Here are some passages where Hume makes the essential points:
  - *“When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer by custom the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain.”* (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion)
  - *“It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species; I do not see that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other.”* However, *“the universe [is] an effect quite singular and unparallelled...”* (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding).

### Distribution of marks

Both parts of the question carry equal value. Students who only address the first part of the question cannot get beyond the 4-6 band. But it is not necessary for both parts of the question to be addressed with the same level of detail and precision to access the full range of marks.

### Notes:

- It is clearly relevant and correct for student to discuss ‘causation’ in relation to Hume’s objection to the design argument, just so long as it is being applied to design arguments and not cosmological arguments.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 5** Can we talk meaningfully about God?

**[25 marks]**

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

<b>Marks</b>	<b>Levels of response mark scheme</b>
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p>

	Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.
1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

### Indicative content

Students may (and are mostly likely to) define God as the omni-God of classical theism (or the ‘God of the philosophers’) – supremely perfect, maximally perfect etc; or the Abrahamic God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (or any one of those traditions). But students may also refer to deistic, pantheistic, or panentheistic concepts of God; or to God as understood in non-Abrahamic religions (eg in Hinduism and Sikhism).

It is also possible for students to successfully answer the question without any formal definition of God, but by referring to the relevant attributes of God (eg those on the Specification) and assessing relevant philosophical arguments concerning the status of religious language in general, but adapted so as to address language about God specifically.

- Students might adopt any of the following positions in answer to the question:
  - Yes – we can talk meaningfully about God
  - No – we cannot talk meaningfully about God
  - To some extent: a more nuanced response might be, ‘Some talk about God is meaningful and some talk about God isn’t meaningful’; or ‘It depends on what you mean by ‘meaningful’/ ‘meaningless’... (eg distinguishing cognitive/descriptive from non-cognitive/non-descriptive meaning).
- **NO:** Verificationists/Logical Positivists (such as Ayer): using the Verification Principle, either the weak or the strong form (as distinguished by Ayer), a proposition is only meaningful if either:
  - it is (1) analytic: conceptual, tautological, logical.
  - or (2a) its probable truth could be empirically verified potentially/in principle (the weak version).
  - or (2b) its truth could be conclusively empirically verified actually/in practice (the strong version).
    - Applying this to religious language, some have argued that religious claims such as ‘God loves me’ and ‘God answers my prayers’ would be meaningless given that they do not meet either of the conditions above.
- **YES:** It might be argued that Ayer’s critique depends on the viability of the verification principle as a test of meaning, and arguably it is not viable: Does it pass its own test (judged against either the analytic or empirical criteria)? If not, then the critique does not get off the ground.
  - For a positive argument in favour of the meaningfulness of religious language, students may discuss Hick for whom religious claims are verifiable – because they meet the empirical requirements of the verification principle – but only eschatologically.

- The latter argument may depend on the strength of the argument that eschatological verification is possible, and so students may discuss Hick's argument for the possibility/plausibility of post-mortem existence. If this argument is found wanting in any way, however, this may be used to defend Ayer's position against Hick.
- **NO:** Flew and the falsification criterion of meaning: Flew's adaptation of Wisdom's 'Parable of the Gardener' shows that the religious believer will not accept anything as falsifying their utterance.
  - Rather than accept that their claims are false, the believer simply keeps modifying their claim, which amounts to a 'death by a thousand qualifications'.
- **YES:** Hare's non-cognitivism: religious language is meaningful, but not as assertions/claims about matters of fact, so the requirements of the falsification/verification principle do not need to be met.
  - Hare's 'Bliks' may be introduced and explained using the lunatic analogy – religious utterances do not assert propositions, but particular world-views/ways of seeing the world. As such, they are not the kinds of things which can be verified/falsified, because they determine what will (and will not) count as evidence.
  - Although 'Bliks' are neither held nor withdrawn on the basis of empirical evidence, they generate meaningful language because they shape our interpretation of the world, the values we hold, and affect how we behave.
- **YES:** Mitchell's cognitivism: religious language can be interpreted as making claims that are falsifiable given what Mitchell regards as a broader and better understanding of what constitutes falsifiability.
  - Mitchell's 'Parable of the Partisan' suggests that religious believers will (and sometimes do) allow for falsification, since they accept that there is evidence which counts against their claim, but not necessarily decisively/conclusively.
  - Even when evidence does weigh against a religious belief, it is not always possible to say in advance what the decisive factor would be. Analogies may be drawn with many other deeply held commitments (eg political), which may change due to new evidence, and yet it was not possible to know from the outset what the tipping point would be. This does not count against the potential truth of religious claims nor the meaning of religious language.
- **To some extent:** Students can also receive credit for using/defending/critiquing other approaches to religious language, such as:
  - the *via negativa* (eg of Pseudo-Dionysius and the apophatic tradition): the only meaningful claims that can be made about God (at least apart from revelation) concern what God is not. Aquinas also takes up the *via negativa* (regarding univocal language about God) and insists that positive language must be strictly analogical.
  - the insistence that language about God is mythic/symbolic (eg Bultmann, Smart, Tillich), which may (or may not) require interpreting in moral or existential terms.
  - other non-cognitive views: eg Wittgenstein's language games; Braithwaite's values-based interpretation of religious language, demonstrating commitments to certain ways of life; Phillips and his so called 'Wittgensteinian fideism';
  - innatism: by having innate ideas of God, this permits us to talk meaningfully about the divine nature, despite God being beyond experience (eg Descartes). But one might question whether this supposed first-person authority of speaking meaningfully about God extends to others (this is analogous to the problem of other minds).

NB: As demonstrated in the indicative content above, this question is designed to test students' ability to answer a question on the meaningfulness of religious language with reference to the concept of God. Because of the wording of the question, it is possible that some students will discuss the coherence/incoherence of the concept of God. Credit is available for this, but only in so far as it is related to the *meaningfulness/meaninglessness* of theological language.

**Notes:**

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make): the focus is on understanding arguments (AO1) and evaluating arguments (AO2). Persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be an error that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**Section B**

**Metaphysics of mind**

**0 6** What do functionalists mean when they claim that mental states can be multiply realised? **[3 marks]**

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

There are two key areas where students can score marks on this question: (1) the functionalist dimension; (2) the multiple realisability dimension. The latter is encountered in other contexts on the Specification (eg in relation to behaviourism and mind-brain type identity theory). It is therefore likely that some students will be able to show some understanding of what it means for a mental state to be ‘multiply realisable’, but not to be able to relate this effectively to what ‘functionalists mean’ by the claim. Conversely, some students will have some understanding of what ‘functionalists’ claim about ‘mental states’, but will not be effective in explaining what it means for them to claim that mental states can be ‘multiply realised’.

Functionalism

Students may (but need not) begin by making general points about what functionalists claim about mental states, which do not simply rephrase the wording of the question. For example:

- Functionalists claim that mental states are (or can be reduced to) functional states (or processes).
- Functionalists claim that mental states are defined by their role within a system of causal relationships between sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavioural outputs.
- Functionalists claim that mental states are defined by their function and not by their internal/intrinsic/essential constitution (and are therefore ontologically neutral).

This in itself is credit worthy (at Level 1). To go further, students will have to address the specific claim that ‘mental states can be multiply realised’. Students who do so may say any of the following:

The functionalist claim that mental states can be multiply realised

- Two or more beings can have the same kind/type of mental state, but whatever realises/constitutes/instantiates that mental state (physically or non-physically) is of a different kind/type.
- Two or more beings can have the same mental state, but the mental state is realised/constituted/instantiated (physically or non-physically) by different states of affairs in each (individual) being.

- A mental state kind/type is not to be identified with any non-functionally specified kind/type and can be realised/constituted/instantiated by different kinds/types (physical or non-physical).
- A mental state is not to be identified with any non-functionally specified state and can be realised/constituted/instantiated by different states (physical or non-physical).

### **Distribution of marks**

- Responses awarded maximum marks will obviously answer the question in one of the (many) ways that meets the Level 3 descriptors: explaining ‘multiply realised’ in functionalist terms (see below for examples).
- Responses awarded 2 marks will address one aspect of the two (scoring) aspects of the question (as identified above) clearly and correctly but may be imprecise on the other; or they may be clear and correct on both, but there may be redundant material with irrelevant or inaccurate content which detracts from the answer.
- Responses awarded 1 mark may make an accurate point about one dimension, but they will be inaccurate on (or omit) the other.
- Although examples are neither asked for nor required, it is likely that many students will use examples of particular mental states (eg pain), and that is fine, so long as it is clear that they understand the general meaning of the claim and do not identify it exclusively with any one mental state.

### Examples of 3-mark responses

- The claim means that different beings can be in the same functional state (eg pain), but this is realised by (or in) differently constituted systems or organisms (eg human beings or octopi).
- Functionalists hold that mental states are functional states (involving causal inputs and outputs). This claim that mental states can be multiply realised means that the same mental state can be instantiated in various/different ways (whether physically or non-physically).
  - NB: Most functionalists tend to be physicalists, and so if students answer in physicalist terms and give physical examples, they can access the full marks. But if students straightforwardly define functionalist claims as physicalist claims, then that is incorrect and inconsistent with the presentation of the position on the current Specification (see below).

### Examples of 2-mark responses

- Functionalism is a physicalist theory of mind whereby mental states are defined by their physical functional role. The multiple realisability claim is that different beings can be in the same functional state but this is constituted by different physical states (eg a human brain and a computer).
- Functionalists hold that mental states are functional states (involving causal inputs and outputs). The claim means that the same kind of mental states can be instantiated in different physical brains and behaviours.

### Examples of 1-mark responses

- Functionalists hold that mental states are functional states (involving causal inputs and outputs).
- The multiple realisability of mental states means that the same mental state can be found in different beings with different brains and behaviours.

### **Notes:**

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 7** Explain Descartes' conceivability argument for substance dualism.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

### Indicative content

- This is an argument for substance dualism, and students may begin with an outline of that position: that there are non-physical/mental substances in addition to physical substances (that minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies).
- The argument might be stated as:
  - P1: I can conceive of my mind/myself existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) existing.
  - P2: Anything that I can ('clearly and distinctly') conceive of is (metaphysically) possible (Descartes puts the point this way: 'God could make it so').
  - C1: Therefore, my mind/myself existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) is (metaphysically) possible.
  - P3: If it is (metaphysically) possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.
    - Students might explain this in terms of identity holding across possible worlds (à la Kripke).
  - C2: Therefore, my mind/myself is not identical with my extended physical body (nor is it identical with any part of the physical world).
- Students might present the argument in terms of clear and distinct ideas (ie I have a clear and distinct idea of the mind and body as having distinct essences and thereby as being distinct substances, and, therefore, they are distinct substances).
- P1 is linked to the cogito and the fact that Descartes can doubt the existence of physical reality, but not the existence of his mind.
- It is a deductive argument (ie intended to be valid/sound) and (arguably) a priori (ie no a posteriori premises).

NB: Students who achieve maximum marks will be clear on the logic of the move from (metaphysical) possibility (established by conceivability) to the actuality of the ontological distinction between mind and body (eg because the metaphysical possibility of their separation demonstrates the impossibility of their substantial identity, or because it demonstrates their distinct essences/natures).

### Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 8** Explain why the good predictive and explanatory power of folk-psychology is an issue for eliminative materialism.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

There are two things that students need to demonstrate here:

1. Understanding of what folk-psychology is and why it has good predictive and explanatory power.
2. Understanding of what eliminative materialists claim (though much of this may be explicit) and why the good predictive and explanatory power of folk-psychology is an issue for eliminative materialism.

Folk-psychology and its good predictive and explanatory power

Folk-psychology may be explained in the following ways:

1. Folk-psychology is an ‘untutored’ or ‘ordinary’ understanding of the mind (one’s own mind and the minds of others) that develops among ordinary/normal people in ordinary/normal circumstances without any special education: it is distinct from a ‘scientific’ understanding of the mind that is the subject-matter of specialists such as psychologists and cognitive scientists.
2. Folk-psychology involves the positing of the existence of ‘inner’ mental states/events with certain features (ie semantic, intentional, causal, phenomenal). Such states include propositional attitudes/intentional states (eg ‘I believe that it will rain’) and qualitative/phenomenal states (ie experiences/feelings/sensations).
3. Folk-psychology (*importantly for this question*) is used by people to explain and predict human behaviour.
4. Folk-psychology is viewed by eliminative materialism as a theory (of mind) because of 2 and 3 above
5. Folk-psychology includes a commitment to the existence of a process by which one might access one’s own mental states: ie introspection.

NB: The focus of this question is 3 above, and so it is not expected that students would give an explanation of folk-psychology with the level of detail above.

- The key idea (based on 3. above) is that folk-psychology has very high predictive and explanatory power. In other words, we do not just use this theory to predict and explain behaviour, but we do this with a large amount of success.

- For example: if one knows that S wants to sit down and that S believes a free chair is nearby one can predict that (all else being equal) S will sit down; when one sees S fall, wince, and cry out, one can confidently explain their behaviour as a result of pain.

Understanding of what eliminative materialists claim and why the good predictive and explanatory power of folk-psychology is an issue for eliminative materialism.

- Eliminative materialism: the claim that some or all common-sense mental states/properties (those that are part of a folk-psychology, as described above) do not exist and/or our common-sense understanding of mind (and folk-psychology itself) is radically mistaken.
- This thesis is defended most notably by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland (although students may associate Dennett with a tendency in that direction).
- The issue posed by the success of folk-psychology in predicting and explaining is that this supports the hypothesis that it is (at least in part or to some extent) true, as opposed to being radically mistaken (as eliminative materialism claims).
- Students might present this as an inductive/abductive argument (to the best explanation) against EM as below:
  - P1: We enjoy a great deal of success when we use common sense folk-psychology to explain and predict the actions of other people.
  - P2: The hypothesis that there are minds and mental states/properties (and laws that feature them) of the kinds posited by folk-psychology best explains this success.
  - C1: Therefore, it is probable/likely that there are minds and mental states/properties (and laws that feature them) of the kinds posited by folk-psychology.
  - C2: Therefore, it is probable/likely that EM is false.

NB: This argument could be presented in deductive form as well.

- Students might, alternatively/additionally, present this issue as follows: eliminative materialism presents itself as a scientific theory and it also wants to argue that 'folk-psychology is non-scientific' (or doesn't stand up to scientific scrutiny). A hallmark of scientific theories is their good predictive and explanatory powers. If folk-psychology has good predictive/explanatory powers it seems as if it is a scientific theory/stands up to scientific scrutiny and therefore cannot be rejected as non-scientific.

NB: Examples are neither asked for nor required, but it is likely that students will use them to fill out and clarify responses. If examples are used, it is not necessary for students to illustrate both the 'predictive power' *and* the 'explanatory power' to access full marks, but it is important that they match their examples to the relevant power (eg students who focus on 'explanatory power' should offer an example of an explanation and not a prediction).

**Notes:**

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 9** Explain interactionist dualism **and** the empirical interaction problem facing it.

**[12 marks]**

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

The question does not specify substance dualism or property dualism, so it would be acceptable to discuss this as a general issue for interactionist dualism or in terms of one or both of these theories in their interactionist form(s).

Explain interactionist dualism...

- (A) Dualism:
  - General: the mind and/or mental states/properties is/are non-physical.
  - Property dualism: at least some mental properties exist that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties (reference to either intentional or phenomenal properties or both).
  - Substance dualism: minds exist and are not identical to physical bodies or to parts of physical bodies (there are two kinds of substance, mental and physical).
    - Students are not asked or required here to give any arguments in favour of this view but should not be penalised for doing so.
- (B) Interactionism:
  - The non-physical/mental interacts causally with the physical/non-mental in both directions:
    - Mental causing physical: eg crying caused by sadness (involuntary) or picking up a crisp caused by desiring a crisp/intending to pick up a crisp (voluntary).
    - Physical causing mental: eg feeling of pain caused by a punch (involuntary).

- The brain might be said to be the locus of this interaction (eg Descartes speculated, in the end wrongly, that the exact locus was the pineal gland).

**and the empirical interaction problem facing it.**

- Empirical issues aim to argue against the possibility of interaction between the non-physical and the physical in one or both directions.
- The **empirical interaction problem** can plausibly be interpreted as being the general issue of the incompatibility of interactionist dualism and current empirical science, and therefore includes several sub-issues.
- They will be a posteriori/empirical issues in the sense that they rule out dualist interaction on the basis of (proposed) empirical/scientific facts (and may, for many, be inductive rather than deductive).
- It is most likely that students will discuss causal closure and the issue posed by laws of physics (including the law of conservation of energy). Here is one way of presenting this issue:
  - P1: The universe is a closed causal system in which the total amount of energy remains constant (conservation of energy principle).
  - P2: Any non-physical to physical causation would have to involve an addition of energy to the physical world (and physical to non-physical causation would have to involve a loss of energy from the physical world).
  - C: Therefore, non-physical to physical causation is not empirically possible.
    - NB: This can be applied equally to physical causing mental: here it would need to be argued that this would require a reduction in energy in the physical world (this is less typically argued, and certainly less typically focused on by proponents of this issue).
- Here are some additional points that could be construed as **empirical issues with interaction**:
  - Science has a long history of explaining seemingly mysterious causation in physical terms (eg gravity was one such ‘mystery’ in the seventeenth century). We should expect this to happen again.
  - There is an absence of any evidence of violations of laws of physics that might be an indication of interference from outside the physical world - we have no evidence of ‘mini-miracles’ where unexpected/inexplicable physical events occur with no known (or at least plausible) physical cause. Hume's ideas on miracles might be relevant here: our evidence that there has been a violation of a law of physics will never be sufficient to outweigh the evidence we have that a law of physics has not been violated.
  - Occam's razor can be used in this context: entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.
- Students do not have to identify the logical form of the empiricist argument to access the full range of marks, but if they do they could present it deductively as well as inductively, so long as the argument contains empirical / a posteriori premises.

**Distribution of marks**

Both parts of the question carry equal value. Students who only address the first part of the question cannot get beyond the 4-6 band. But it is not necessary for both parts of the question to be addressed with the same level of detail and precision to access the full range of marks.

- NB: The second part of this question should not be confused with the conceptual problems raised, for example, by Princess Eliabeth of Bohemia. Bearing in mind that this is one specified line of attack against interactionist dualism on the Specification, it is worthy of some credit, especially for those who know little else on the second part of the question. But students accessing the higher bands (7-9 and 10-12) will focus exclusively (or at least predominately) on the ‘empirical’ objection.

**Notes:**

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**1 0** Is philosophical behaviourism correct?

**[25 marks]**

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

<b>Marks</b>	<b>Levels of response mark scheme</b>
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument.                  There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.                  There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.                  There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

### Indicative content

- The philosophical behaviourist may be presented as claiming the following:
  - ‘Hard’ philosophical behaviourism (including Hempel): all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements.
  - ‘Soft’ philosophical behaviourism (including Ryle): propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language).
- It is a view that is typically seen (certainly in its ‘hard’ form) as a form of physicalism (or materialism) about the mind; it is listed under this family of positions in the Specification; and so it is highly likely to be treated as such here.
- Some rather narrow/strict views of physicalism may exclude certain forms of behaviourism; equally, some thinkers characterised as behaviourists (eg Ryle) may want to disassociate their position from physicalism/materialism. Students should be credited if they show knowledge of these disputes, but there is no expectation that they will.
- Students may adopt any of the following positions:
  - YES: at least some form of philosophical behaviourism does give the correct account of mental states.
  - NO: philosophical behaviourism (in one or more of the forms discussed) does not give the correct account of mental states.
  - TO SOME EXTENT: in some respect(s) philosophical behaviourism gives the correct account of mental states, but in some respects it does not. This nuanced approach is fine so long as this conclusion is not self-contradictory. One way of doing this might be that behaviourism is true of some statements about some mental states, but not all.

### YES:

- Verificationism in support of philosophical behaviourism: in order for talk/communication about the mind to be meaningful, it needs to be empirically verifiable and must, therefore, describe events that are publicly observable. This is what explains our ability to learn mental vocabulary.
- Some see philosophical behaviourism as having the advantage of bypassing the ‘problem of other minds’ that faces other theories (notably dualism, especially in its substance form).
- Philosophical behaviourism does not face any issues that arise from the interaction of the non-physical with the physical (because when we talk about ‘the mental’ we are not talking about the kind of thing of which it makes sense to ascribe causal powers), or, relatedly, the location of ‘the mental’ (because when we talk about ‘the mental’ we are not talking about the kind of thing of which it makes sense to ascribe a location). In this way, it overcomes central problems with dualism.
- Ryle (and Wittgenstein) argue that a wrong ‘picture’ of how mental words function leads us to insuperable difficulties (including those in the bullet points above) and if we recognise such category errors, we can dispel the ‘ghost in the machine’ by realising that mental talk is talk of complex (open-ended, multi-track) dispositions. In order for mental words to be both learnable

and meaningful, they must be part of a common language and hence meanings cannot be hidden.

**NO:**

- Using a version of the ‘Mary’ argument in this context: If behaviourism were true then Mary would have all propositional knowledge, which she does not (as she would lack knowledge about qualia/phenomenal properties).
  - In response behaviourists might argue that Mary gains nothing more than abilities/dispositions that day, as opposed to propositional knowledge.
- Using the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument in this context: If statements about the mind were just statements about behaviour then we would not be able to conceive of behaviour existing without mind (ie zombies) but we can. (This could be put in terms of lacking a mind generally, lacking qualia/phenomenal properties or lacking intentionality/intentional properties.)
  - In response behaviourists might deny that such beings are conceivable (or, at least, claim that talk of such beings is meaningless).
- The distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ and ‘perfect actors’): if the mind were just behaviour then we would not be able to conceive of mind existing without the associated behaviour, but we can conceive of this.
- Issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to...
  - (a) circularity: philosophical behaviourists face an issue defining mental states satisfactorily due to circularity, be this ‘general’ circularity (mental states cannot be analysed without reference to other mental states) or ‘specific’ circularity (the definition of mental state A will require reference to other mental states B and C as part of its analysis which, when defined themselves, will ultimately require reference back to A).
    - In response behaviourists might deny that such circularity is problematic.
  - (b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour: philosophical behaviourists face an issue defining mental states satisfactorily due to the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour (there is no specific way that one acts when in pain, and there are many, arguably infinite, possibilities).
    - In response behaviourists might accept this but regard it as unproblematic (eg, arguably, Ryle) or they might argue that any differences in behaviour are accounted for by differences in *other* mental states.
- The asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states: philosophical behaviourism implies (counterintuitively) that I sometimes know (or justify claims about) others’ minds in the same way, to the same extent, and using the same process, as I know (or justify claims about) my own mental states.
  - In response behaviourists might argue that there is no such asymmetry (Ryle says something akin to this: eg *“If we now raise the epistemologist’s question, ‘How does a person find out what mood he is in?’ we can answer that ...he finds it out very much as we find it out.”*)
- Other issues relating specifically to qualia:
  - qualia are defined by their intrinsic properties yet behaviourism analyses (away) mental states into relational properties (behavioural dispositions) and so fails to capture qualia.
  - the ‘inverted’ qualia objection might be used in this context – ie the conceivability/possibility of behavioural duplicates that are qualia inverts.
    - In response behaviourists might put forward anti-qualia arguments (eg those of the kind proposed by Dennett).
    - Similarly they might argue that statements about qualia cannot be verified and are, as such, meaningless.
- Issues with causal explanation:
  - Philosophical behaviourism gives an inadequate account of mental causation: What answer can a behaviourist give to the question, ‘Why did he raise his hand?’. The intuitive answer

'Because he wanted to ask a question and so raised his hand' no longer describes a causal sequence).

**Notes:**

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make): the focus is on understanding arguments (AO1) and evaluating arguments (AO2). Persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be an error that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.